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INTRODUCTION
Application of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) dispute resolu-
tion procedures to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS Agreement) has provoked a variety of reactions over time.
At its inception, the decision to enforce the treaty through the WTO's dis-
pute resolution process was widely viewed as a loss for developing
countries. Many feared it would lead to an explosion of litigation against
developing countries and cause distortions in domestic intellectual property
(IP) policy making.' More recent scholarship, however, has argued that the-
se fears were unfounded. Few disputes before WTO panels have involved
violations of the TRIPS Agreement, even fewer have been brought against
developing countries, and none of those have authorized the withdrawal of
trade concessions. 2
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. My thanks to Rebecca
Bratspies, Elizabeth Chambliss, Harlan Cohen, Evan Criddle, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Steve
Ellmann, Doni Gewirtzman, Larry Heifer, Patricia Judd, Joel Trachtman, and Peter Yu for
very helpful feedback in the research and drafting of this Article. Earlier drafts benefited
greatly from discussions on a "New Voices" panel at the 2011 ASIL Annual Meeting, the
faculty workshop at New York Law School, and a 2010 JILSA workshop. Christopher Bruno,
Beulah Chou, Robert Habermann, Zalika Pierre, and David Rodrigues provided excellent re-
search assistance.
1. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV.-INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUST. DEV. [UNCTAD-
ICTSD], RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 659-64 (2005) [hereinafter TRIPS
RESOURCE BOOK]; see also Joost Pauwelyn, The Dog that Barked but Didn't Bite: 15 Years of
Intellectual Property Disputes at the WTO, 1 J. INT'L Disp. SETTLEMENT 389, 392 (2010)
(discussing responses).
2. Pauwelyn, supra note 1, at 395-96.
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This Article argues that the availability of adjudication through the
WTO has indeed had significant consequences for the policy space of de-
veloping countries-just not in the manner initially imagined. Although the
TRIPS Agreement has given rise to relatively few litigated cases overall, the
threat of defending a costly complaint and the possibility of sanctions have
contributed to a culture of overcompliance that has discouraged countries
from experimenting with flexibilities protected under the treaty.' Yet the
problem of trade adjudication is not so much a problem of adjudication as it
is of trade. Although the decision to link trade and intellectual property has
transformed intellectual property discourse in a variety of ways, 4 one of its
most underappreciated consequences has been the conflation of trade and
intellectual property jurisprudence in TRIPS dispute resolution. In an im-
portant case interpreting exceptions and limitations under TRIPS, the panel
applied an interpretive approach drawn from trade cases that was fundamen-
tally at odds with the structure and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. The
decision to subject intellectual property decision making to adjudication
within the trade system has thereby led to overly restrictive interpretations
that do not respect the intentions of the parties or the needs of intellectual
property policy making.
This Article proposes the use of a more deferential standard of review
and a human rights presumption to remedy these overly restrictive interpre-
tations. Panels should consider and respect the purposes states attempt to
achieve through intellectual property regulation and should give greater pre-
sumptive weight to state policies that seek to fulfill human rights and protect
human health and dignity. Additional deference to state priorities is appro-
priate given the object and purpose of the treaty and the nature of
intellectual property regulation itself. Moreover, such deference is particu-
larly important with respect to least developed countries. Several provisions
of the WTO-covered agreements require special attention to the needs of
least developed countries, and a deferential standard of review would be an
important means of giving content to these terms.
Part I of this Article considers the possibility of overcompliance with
the TRIPS Agreement, identifying the flexibilities protected under the treaty
and discussing the way in which many states have refrained from imple-
menting these flexibilities into domestic law. Part II examines how the
3. Cf Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property System: Trea-
ties, Norms, National Courts, and Private Ordering, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT 61, 77 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007) ("International intellectual property
law now has real teeth.").
4. Some have condemned the "trade-IP" linkage as effectively establishing econom-
ics as the prime narrative for discussions about intellectual property, thus crowding out other
important values and policy justifications (such as innovation) that might have provided a
more balanced framework. Others have argued that the use of a trade framework allows the
use of liability rather than property rules and thus opens up space for states to permit in-
fringements when economically justified. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture
of the International Intellectual Property System, 77 ClI.-KENT L. REV. 993, 1004 (2002);
Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 828 (2007).
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decision to link intellectual property protection to the dispute resolution
mechanism of the WTO has contributed to this reluctance to make use of
TRIPS flexibilities. Part III argues for the adoption of a standard of re-
view designed with intellectual property in mind, one that would consider
the purposes a state regulation was designed to achieve and privilege
human rights purposes. Part IV maintains that additional deference is
especially warranted in reviewing the intellectual property policies of least
developed nations.
I. TRIPS OVERCOMPLIANCE
With the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement in 1994, developed coun-
tries successfully made compliance with certain minimum intellectual
property standards a requirement of membership in the WTO. Under most
definitions of the term, the TRIPS Agreement5 might be considered a suc-
cess story for international law. Compared to most international treaties, the
TRIPS Agreement has enjoyed not only widespread ratification but also
high levels of domestic compliance-at least with respect to the laws on the
books. In fact, one might even argue that it has been too successful. Despite
considerable ambiguity in its terms and a professed commitment to impos-
ing only minimum standards, states have not exploited these flexibilities to
implement the treaty in ways consistent with local needs and values. Many
have even adopted intellectual property laws that provide far greater protec-
tion than is required by the terms of the treaty itself.
A. TRIPS Flexibilities
One of the most widespread critiques of the TRIPS Agreement has been
that it limits the ability of member states to tailor their domestic intellectual
property laws in ways that foster innovation and protect human health and
welfare.6 Peter Yu, for example, has characterized the TRIPS Agreement as
5. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. The TRIPS Agreement was negotiated as part
of a set of agreements concluded in 1994 that created the WTO and strengthened the mechanism
for resolving trade disputes. Annexed to the principal agreement establishing the WTO was a
series of topic-specific agreements regulating issues ranging from trade in goods and services to
textiles and clothing, agriculture, and antidumping (collectively called the "covered agree-
ments"). The TRIPS Agreement is one of these covered agreements and establishes minimum
standards for intellectual property protection in the domestic law of WTO member states. See
generally What Is the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG. [WTO], http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto-e/whatis-e/wto-dg-stat-e.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
6. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and Essential Medicines: Must One Size Fit
All? Making the WTO Responsive to the Global Health Crisis, in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL
HEALTH 36, 52 (Thomas Pogge et al. eds., 2010); Anselm Kamperman Sanders, Intellectual
Property Treaties and Development, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOP-
MENT, supra note 3, at 157, 164; James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of
Intellectual Property, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0009, at 3-4; Peter K. Yu, The Objectives
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part of an "international enclosure movement" that has "enclose[d] the
policy space of individual countries and require[d] them to adopt one-
size-fits-all legal standards that ignore their local needs, national interests,
technological capabilities, and public health conditions."7
The ability to tailor intellectual property policies to domestic conditions
is critical for several reasons. First, intellectual property policies may need
to vary by country in order to protect human health and welfare. The debate
about access to medicines is perhaps the best-known example of this: de-
pending on its health needs and resources, a state may need to limit patent
rights on some kinds of medicines in order to make those medicines afford-
able.8 The importance of tailoring intellectual property law to protect human
rights extends to all types of intellectual property and all types of rights.
Copyright may need to be limited through doctrinal tools such as fair use in
order to ensure that educational materials do not become unaffordable or
unavailable 9 or to facilitate individuals' ability to participate in culture. 10
Fair use exceptions to copyright law help protect the right to free expres-
sion.II Patent rights may need to be limited in order to ensure the continued
development of scientific research and the ability to share in the benefits of
such research.12 The kinds of human rights and public policy problems pre-
sented by intellectual property rights also vary by industry: "The broad
patents available for basic science present different problems from those as-
and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 Hous. L. REV. 979, 981 (2009); Henning Grosse
Ruse-Khan, IP Enforcement Beyond Exclusive Rights 13 (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual
Prop., Competition & Tax Law, Research Paper Series No. 09-08, 2009).
7. Yu, supra note 4, at 828, 832 (emphasis omitted).
8. See Chuan-feng Wu, Raising the Right to Health Concerns Within the Framework
of International Intellectual Property Law, 5 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y
141, 164-65 (2010).
9. See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property 'from Below": Copyright and Capabil-
ity for Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 825-27 (2007).
10. See Molly Beutz Land, Intellectual Property Rights and the Right to Participate in
Cultural Life 3-5 (Inst. for Info. Law & Policy at N.Y. Law Sch., White Paper Series 08/09
No. 02, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1475430.
11. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (noting that U.S. copyright law
"contains built-in First Amendment accommodations" such as the idea-expression dichotomy
and the fair use defense).
12. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
at 37-38, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d
181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09-Civ-4515) (arguing that patents on certain genes violated Arti-
cle I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, which allows Congress to create exclusive
rights "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." because the patents impeded
instead of promoted the progress of science). See generally Lea Shaver, The Right to Science
and Culture, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 121 (arguing that Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights was intended to promote universal access to science and culture).
[Vol. 33:433
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sociated with the thickets of narrow rights awarded in fields where advances
are incremental. 13
Second, intellectual property policy must be tailored to local conditions
in order to promote innovation and development. As Katherine Strandburg has
noted, "it is particularly problematic to enshrine a one-size-fits-all approach to
innovation in an international agreement because states are likely to be het-
erogeneous in their preferred innovation approaches."'4 The intellectual
property policies that will foster innovation and development in one context
are different from those necessary in another. 5 For example, emerging
economies like Brazil and India may benefit from robust intellectual proper-
ty protection in certain areas. 16 States may also need to vary across
industries the strength of the protection they provide. China, for example,
may want strong rights for its software industry but weaker rights for phar-
maceuticals in order to ensure sufficient access to medicines and incentivize
software production. 17 Data exclusivity can provide incentives for research
into traditional medicines in countries that have substantial indigenous-
knowledge resources.'" The speed of changes in the digital environment has
the potential to make flexibilities just as important for developed nations as
they are for developing nations. 9
Third, intellectual property policies must be tailored to conform to local
values and concerns. Intellectual property policies often involve consideration
of issues intimately bound up with local values, such as freedom of
13. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without Discriminat-
ing: Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 445, 445 (2007).
14. Katherine J. Strandburg, Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the Global Intellec-
tual Property Regime, 41 CONN. L. REV. 861, 891 (2009).
15. See Yu, supra note 4, at 896 (arguing that patent regulation must be tailored to
each country's individual "economic, social, cultural, and technological conditions"); see al-
so Daniel J. Gervais, TRIPS and Development, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 3, 51-52 ("lIlntellectual property rules must be properly cal-
ibrated as part of a broader domestic innovation and knowledge optimization strategy.");
Henrique Choer Moraes & Otivio Brandelli, The Development Agenda at WIPO: Context
and Origins, in THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 33, 42 (Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., 2009) ("In
sum, numerous studies and leading development experts concur that countries must have
flexibility to tailor IPR to their development needs."); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Introduction:
The WIPO Development Agenda and Its Development Policy Context, in THE DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA, supra, at 1, 6 ("[I]t is apparent that the neoliberal one-size-fits-all approach to
property and markets has no more purchase as it pertains to intellectual property than it does
with respect to development generally.").
16. Shamnad Basheer & Annalisa Primi, The WIPO Development Agenda: Factoring
in the "Technologically Proficient" Developing Countries, in IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION'S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 100, 107 (Jeremy de
Beer ed., 2009).
17. Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 173, 208-09.
18. Basheer & Primi, supra note 16, at 108.
19. PatriciaL. Judd, Toward a TRIPS Truce, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 613, 642-43 (2011).
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expression. 20 States may want broader exceptions to copyright for parody or
news reporting in order to provide more protection to expression. States
with indigenous populations may want more extensive protections for tradi-
tional knowledge. Others with artisanal or local production of specialty
goods may want stronger protections for geographic indications.
Given the importance of tailored intellectual property policies, academ-
ics and activists have developed a variety of different proposals for
increasing the policy space available to states to tailor innovation policy to
local needs. Some have focused on halting the continual expansion of intel-
lectual property norms through rules that would limit levels of international
property protection2 1 or require exceptions and limitations to rights. 22 Others
have suggested limiting intellectual property rights through reliance on oth-
er sources of international obligations, such as human rights agreements,
23
or the development of norms that would require greater scrutiny when intel-
lectual property rights conflict with basic needs. 24 An initiative headed by
Annette Kur and Marianne Levin called "Intellectual Property Rights in
Transition" has proposed several amendments to TRIPS that would expand
the treaty's "capacity to provide a balanced framework for legislative and
adjudicative activities. '25
Yet the critique that the TRIPS Agreement imposes "one-size-fits-all"
solutions that must be limited through the creation of substantive ceilings,
amendments to TRIPS, or external norms like human rights is in some ten-
20. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should
Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 513-14 (2000).
21. See Annette Kur & Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Enough Is Enough: The Notion of
Binding Ceilings in International Intellectual Property Protection, in INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS IN A FAIR WORLD TRADE SYSTEM 359, 360-66 (Annette Kur ed., 2011).
22. See P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT 35-49 (2008), available at
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/information/articles-publications/publications/copyright-20
080506/copyright_20080506.pdf; Andrew Rens, Implementing the WIPO Development
Agenda: Treaty Provisions on Minimum Exceptions and Limitations for Education, in IM-
PLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION'S DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA, supra note 16, at 158, 158.
23. See, e.g., Christophe Geiger, Implementing an International Instrument for Inter-
preting Copyright Limitations and Exceptions, 40 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION
L. 627, 629-31 (2009); Ruth L. Okediji, The Limits of Development Strategies at the Inter-
section of Intellectual Property and Human Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE, AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 355, 365. States and advocates have also used other norms
and institutions to bring pressure on intellectual property law regimes. Laurence R. Heifer,
Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual
Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (2004) (calling this "regime shifting").
24. Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2821, 2885 (2006).
25. ANNETTE KuR & MARIANNE LEVIN, THE IPT PROJECT: PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT 3 (2011), available at http://infojustice.org/download/gcongress/limit-
ationsandexceptionsforspecialsubjectsandobjects/Kur%20and%2OLevin%20-%20%2OProposas
%20to%2OReform%20the%20TRIPS%20Agreement%20-%2OMay%202011 .pdf.
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sion with the goals and structure of the treaty itself. By its own terms, the
TRIPS Agreement imposes only minimum standards. Although they are re-
quired to respect its provisions, WTO member states "may, but shall not be
obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is re-
quired" and "shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal sys-
tem and practice. '26 In recent years, scholars have begun to emphasize the
way in which provisions of the TRIPS Agreement itself 27 or new ways of in-
terpreting the treaty 28 provide significant flexibility to member states to limit
the reach of intellectual property norms. Specifically, there are several dif-
ferent types of "flexibilities" contained in the Agreement that provide states
with considerable leeway in implementing their obligations under the treaty.
Explicit exemptions. Certain kinds of regulatory decisions are explicitly
reserved to states. For example, Article 27(2) allows countries to exclude in-
ventions from patentability to "protect ordre public or morality, including to
protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to
the environment."2 9 The Agreement also provides countries with the authori-
ty to impose exceptions and limitations on exclusive rights30 and expressly
refrains from taking a position on the exhaustion of intellectual property
rights, thus allowing countries to permit goods lawfully sold abroad to be
imported into the country without requiring the right holder's permission.3
26. TRIPS Agreement art. 1 (1).
27. See Denis Borges Barbosa et al., Slouching Towards Development in International
Intellectual Property, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 71, 98-113; Yu, supra note 6, at 1020-31;
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Comparative Analysis of Policy Space in WTO Law 62 (Max
Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop., Competition & Tax Law, Research Paper Series No. 08-02,
2008).
28. See Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the "Three-Step Test" in Copy-
right Law, reprinted in 39 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 707, 707-11 (2008);
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Designing a Global Intellectual Property
System Responsive to Change: The WTO, WIPO, and Beyond, 46 Hous. L. REv. 1187, 1215-
16 (2009).
29. TRIPS Agreement art. 27(2). See generally Caroline Henckels, The Ostensible
"Flexibilities" in TRIPS: Can Essential Pharmaceuticals Be Excluded from Patentability in
Public Health Crises?, 32 MONASH U. L. REV. 335, 343-46 (2006) (discussing difficulties
countries may encounter in taking advantage of Article 27(2)).
30. See TRIPS Agreement arts. 13, 17, 30. See generally SISULE F. MUSUNGU & CE-
CILIA OH, COMM'N ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH, THE USE OF
FLEXIBILITIES IN TRIPS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CAN THEY PROMOTE ACCESS TO MED-
ICINES?, at iv-viii (2005) (discussing several explicit TRIPS flexibilities that could be used to
promote access to medicines).
31. TRIPS Agreement art. 6. See generally CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED As-
PECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 78
(2007) (highlighting that Article 6 "declares the admissibility of the international exhaustion
of rights, that is, the possibility of legally importing into a country a product protected by
intellectual property rights, after the product has been put on the market in a foreign mar-
ket").
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Balancing provisions. Two provisions of the Agreement, although not
specifying particular limitations that states may impose on intellectual prop-
erty rights, do identify general purposes that states may seek to achieve in
implementing their obligations under the treaty. Article 7 provides:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of
rights and obligations.3 2
Article 8 of the Agreement allows states to adopt measures consistent
with the Agreement that are "necessary to protect public health and nutri-
tion, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their
socio-economic and technological development" or "to prevent the abuse of
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of
technology."33
Procedural flexibilities. Developing and least developed countries were
given additional time to comply with the provisions of the Agreement. De-
veloping countries had until January 1, 2000, to implement the Agreement34
and could optionally delay application of the product patent provisions until
January 1, 2005, in certain fields.35 Least developed countries were given
ten years to implement the treaty, or until January 1, 2005 .36 (This deadline
has been extended to July 1, 2013, in general and until January 1, 2016,
with respect to pharmaceuticals.)37
Standards. Several provisions of the treaty establish what Yuval Shany
calls "inherently flexible ... 'standard-type' norms.*"38 The three most im-
portant of these are Articles 13, 17, and 30, which describe the conditions
under which states may impose limitations or exceptions to copyright,
trademark, and patent rights, respectively. These articles, which collectively
govern "exceptions and limitations" to intellectual property, provide as fol-
lows:
32. TRIPS Agreement art. 7.
33. Id. art. 8(1)-(2).
34. Id. art. 65(1)-(3).
35. Id. art. 65(4).
36. Id. art. 66(1).
37. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the
Transition Period Under Article 66.1 for Least-Developed Country Members, IP/C/40 (Nov.
30, 2005); Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of
the Transition Period Under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed
Country Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products,
IP/C/25 (July 1, 2002).
38. Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International
Law?, 16 EuR. J. INT'L L. 907, 914 (2005).
[Vol. 33:433
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Article 13 [Copyright]: Members shall confine limitations or excep-
tions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unrea-
sonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.
Article 17 [Trademark]: Members may provide limited exceptions
to the rights conferred by a trademark, such as fair use of descrip-
tive terms, provided that such exceptions take account of the
legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of third par-
ties.
Article 30 [Patent]: Members may provide limited exceptions to the
exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such excep-
tions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third
parties. 39
The TRIPS Agreement does not define the terms "unreasonably," "normal,"
or "legitimate" as used in these articles, thus providing room for interpreta-
tion based on national conditions.
The Agreement also imposes standard-type norms in describing the ob-
ligations of states with respect to the enforcement of intellectual property
rights. Article 41(1), for example, provides that members shall ensure that
enforcement procedures "permit effective action" against acts of infringe-
ment and provides that they make available "expeditious remedies to
prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further
infringements. '4° Article 41(1) does not, however, define "effective" or "ex-
peditious," leaving these terms to be interpreted consistently with local
context.
Textual silence. Although it requires states to establish certain minimum
levels of protection and to do so without discrimination, the treaty largely
does not dictate the ways in which states should go about achieving these
goals. For example, although states are required to ensure that "patents shall
be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields
of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are
capable of industrial application,"4 the treaty does not define "new," "in-
ventive step," or "industrial application." India, for example, has taken
advantage of this flexibility by excluding from patentability "both new
uses of known substances and ... new forms of known substances that do
39. TRIPS Agreement arts. 13, 17, 30.
40. Id. art. 41(1).
41. Id. art. 27(1).
Spring 2012]
Michigan Journal of International Law
not enhance 'efficacy.' ",42 It has also established a high "inventive step"
threshold for patents as well as "several innovative procedural mechanisms
that could help examiners identify suspect patents and that could create hur-
dles for applicants."43
B. Lack of Implementation
Despite the availability of a variety of flexibilities under the treaty,
many countries have not taken advantage of these flexibilities to tailor na-
tional policies to local conditions. Carolyn Deere, in her survey of the
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, observes that a number of
states-including many least developed countries-have explicitly forgone
the flexibilities they would otherwise be entitled to use and have adopted
national laws in excess of what is required by TRIPS.' Surprisingly, this
variation does not seem to be a factor of economic development: some of
the poorest countries had the highest levels of protection, while some devel-
oping countries with the greatest technological capacity had mixed
approaches to implementation.45
Granted, this process of "enclosure" has not been "unidirectional."46
Developing countries and their allies have fought and won several legal and
political battles to defend their rights to use TRIPS flexibilities in designing
national intellectual property policies. South Africa successfully defended
its right to issue compulsory licenses, thus preserving important bargaining
power in pressuring pharmaceutical companies to reduce prices on an-
tiretroviral medications.47 The Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, signed during the Doha negotiations in 2001, recognized the
ability of WTO members under the TRIPS Agreement to "tak[e] measures
to protect public health. '48 Developing countries also organized around the
42. Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Im-
plementation in India's Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1590 (2009); see
also Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 60 (noting several additional ways in which India could revise
its law to limit patentability in ways consistent with TRIPS).
43. Kapczynski, supra note 42, at 1598.
44. See, e.g., CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME 73, 81, 91-94, 98 (2009)
(describing instances where countries implemented the TRIPS Agreement in excess of re-
quired standards).
45. Id. at 102. A number of states have also entered into bilateral trade and investment
agreements in which they have bound themselves to provide "TRIPS-plus" protection be-
yond that required by the TRIPS Agreement to nationals of the other contracting state. Id. at
151-55.
46. Yu, supra note 4, at 872.
47. See generally Robert Weissman, AIDS Drugs for Africa: Grassroots Pressure Over-
comes U.S.-Industry "Full Court Press" to Block South Africa's Affordable Medicine Program,
MULTINAT'L MONITOR, Sept. 1999, at 9, available at http://www.multinational
monitor.org/mml 999/091999/weissman.html.
48. WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2001 on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, 4, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001) [hereinafter Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health].
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Development Agenda, a set of principles adopted by the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) that "reflects developing countries' growing
resistance to the upward harmonization of IP protection required by the
TRIPS and subsequent 'TRIPS-plus' bilateral free trade agreements.
49
Furthermore, some states have taken advantage of the flexibilities al-
lowed under the TRIPS Agreement. As Deere documents, thirty-three
developing countries have adopted a rule of international exhaustion, which
exhausts the fight holder's ability to object to further distribution or importa-
tion of that particular good once the good is sold anywhere in the world.5"
All of the developing countries Deere surveyed that had updated their intel-
lectual property laws to conform with TRIPS excluded diagnostic,
therapeutic, and surgical methods from patentability." A majority allowed
third parties to use inventions under patent for experimental, scientific, or
research purposes.5 2 Most also allowed compulsory licensing of patented in-
ventions, although the grounds for issuing such licenses varied.53
India has been particularly innovative in redesigning its intellectual
property policies in ways that increase access to medicines. As Amy
Kapczynski has described, India implemented several new and innovative
flexibilities when it revised its laws to comply with the TRIPS Agreement,
including "novel limitations on subject matter, an exceptionally high in-
ventive step standard, procedural requirements that could substantially
decrease the grant rate, a patent misuse standard that may sharply constrain
voluntary licensing activity, and perhaps most strikingly, limits on injunctive
remedies."54 Among other things, these legal innovations would limit patents
on new uses for known substances that do not enhance efficacy, thus pre-
venting companies from obtaining successive patents (and thus an extended
term of protection) on changes to a pharmaceutical not related to the drug's
efficacy. 5 India's laws would also require the disclosure of additional in-
formation during the patent application process, a requirement that "can
both increase the accuracy of determinations in the patent office and de-
crease the grant rate."56 Finally, the use of damages instead of injunctive
relief could encourage generic companies to "enter the market and invite
49. Netanel, supra note 15, at 2-3; see also Ruth L. Okediji, History Lessons for the
WIPO Development Agenda, in THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 15, at 137, 140.
50. DEERE, supra note 44, at 75-76. Because the sale of the IP-protected good any-
where in the world exhausts the right holder's rights with respect to that good, a rule of
international exhaustion enables parallel importation, which is the importation of "IP-
protected products (such as patented medicines) from countries where they may be sold at a
lower price than on the domestic market." Id. at 75.
51. Id. at77.
52. Id. at 81.
53. Id. at 81-82.
54. Kapczynski, supra note 42, at 1589.
55. Id. at 1590-91.
56. Id. at 1601.
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infringement suits or licenses wherever they could markedly undercut the
originator's price."57
Despite these successes, efforts to use TRIPS flexibilities have been
remarkably limited overall. In the area of patents, only the Andean Commu-
nity (a subregional union comprising Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and
Peru)58 and five other countries have excluded all plant, animal, and genetic
material from patentability.5 9 The TRIPS Agreement is silent on whether
states must grant patents on new uses for known substances, but only twelve
of 106 developing countries surveyed in 2006 specifically excluded these
from patentability. 60 Fewer than ten of these surveyed countries allowed use
of patented goods in order to obtain marketing approval. 61 Most also had
fairly rigorous protection for test data, even though TRIPS provides consid-
erable flexibility in this regard. As Deere notes, although TRIPS allows
countries to decide "whether information provided to a pharmaceutical
regulatory authority can be relied on by a subsequent applicant seeking to
obtain approval for a bio-equivalent product," according to a survey of
forty-nine developing countries, only Argentina explicitly allowed subse-
quent applicants to rely on such data; in forty-one others, this ability was
curtailed, and in ten, it was prohibited or severely curtailed.62
There has been even less use of flexibilities with respect to copyrights.
The TRIPS Agreement is compatible with a range of exceptions and limita-
tions to copyright that could significantly increase access to information,
education, and culture. For example, copyright can be limited in order to al-
low personal use, criticism and review, educational use, reproduction by the
press, recording of broadcasts for the creation of official archives, and re-
productions by libraries.63 Countries can also limit copyright to increase
access to creative works by people with disabilities or to facilitate interoper-
ability of computer programs.64 Yet few countries have made broad use of
these copyright exceptions and limitations. As Deere notes, "[t]he majority
of developing countries provided only a limited range of limitations and ex-
ceptions to copyright" and "made little use of TRIPS flexibilities that might
have helped improve access to education and distance learning. '65 Some did
provide individual exceptions for education, science, and translation,66
among other things, but few have followed the lead of developed countries
57. Id. at 1607.
58. About Us, COMUNIDAD ANDINA, http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/who.htm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
59. DEERE, supra note 44, at 77-78.
60. Id. at 78-79.
61. Id. at 81.
62. Id. at 84.
63. Id. at 90.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 91.
66. Id. at 91-92.
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such as the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom in enacting a
broad exclusion for "fair use."67 In addition, a significant number of coun-
tries have adopted terms of protection that far exceed the required term of
the life of the author plus fifty years.
61
II. LINKING IP TO WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Although the feared explosion of TRIPS litigation against developing
countries never materialized, the threat of such litigation has contributed to
a culture of overcompliance. Further, the pressures on states to implement
provisions in excess of what is required by the treaty have been compound-
ed by overly restrictive interpretations that bar consideration of public
policy. This Part discusses the way in which the decision to subject the
TRIPS Agreement to trade dispute resolution has restricted the policy space
available to states to tailor their national intellectual property policies.
A. Threat of Litigation
The decision to subject the TRIPS Agreement to the dispute resolution
mechanism of the WTO was highly contested at the time of the treaty's con-
clusion. Developed countries negotiating the TRIPS Agreement insisted that
intellectual property be subject to the Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).69 The DSU provides a
mechanism for states to bring complaints against one another for violations
of any WTO agreement and to obtain a binding decision on that complaint
from an adjudicatory panel. 70 The DSU also establishes a standing body,
called the Appellate Body, that hears appeals of panel decisions.7 A panel
can sanction a member state for violating the TRIPS Agreement by author-
izing the complaining state to suspend trade benefits to which the violator
state is otherwise entitled by virtue of its membership in the WTO.72 If the
violator state does not comply with a panel's recommendations, 73 the DSU
allows the complaining state to "request authorization ... to suspend the
67. Id. at 91.
68. Id. at 92-93.
69. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
70. Id. arts. 4, 16(4).
71. Id. art. 17.
72. Id. art. 22(1). Compensation is also available but is "voluntary," id., and thus "de-
pends on a common agreement between the parties to the dispute," TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK,
supra note I, at 688.
73. See DSU art. 19 ("Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure
is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned
bring the measure into conformity with that agreement.").
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application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations
under the covered agreements. 74
Several developing nations initially opposed applying the DSU to the
TRIPS Agreement, fearing that it would result in significant litigation
against developing countries." At the same time, there were also potential
benefits. Developing countries hoped that the DSU's prohibition on uni-
lateral trade retaliation could restrain the risk of unilateral trade
sanctions. 76 They also hoped that "legalization" 77 of dispute resolution at
the WTO would help "insulat[e] them against the pressures of power poli-
tics" and "limit the scope of the debate to the legal merits."78 In the end,
proponents of dispute resolution prevailed. Article 64 of the TRIPS
Agreement provides that disputes under that Agreement will be resolved
pursuant to the dispute resolution mechanism of the DSU.
79
Although the decision to subject the TRIPS Agreement to the WTO
dispute resolution mechanism did not result in the explosion of litigation
that many had feared,80 it nonetheless has been a factor in limiting the
space available for developing country experimentation. As Carolyn
Deere has documented, developed countries used the DSU process to-
gether with threats of unilateral economic sanctions to pressure countries
to forgo flexibilities. 8' Of course, the threat of litigation was only one of
many factors driving implementation. Other factors that influenced the
ways in which implementation occurred included domestic capacity for
74. Id. art. 22(2). Sanctions are generally limited to the sector in which the violation
occurred hut may be expanded to other sectors or other covered agreements if necessary. Id.
art. 22(3)(a)-(c). The level of the sanction imposed must be equal to the harm occurring as a
result of the violation, id. art. 22(4), and the Dispute Settlement Body must refer disputes
about the sanction to arbitration in certain circumstances, id. art. 22(6).
75. TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 659-64; Pauwelyn, supra note 1, at 392.
76. See TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 663, 686; Karen Kaiser, Article 64:
Dispute Settlement, in WTO: TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
798, 800 (Peter-Tobias Stoll et al. eds., 2009).
77. The reforms of the dispute settlement process associated with the creation of the
WTO have been characterized as a process of "legalization." See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, How
to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing Countries: Some Proactive
Developing Country Strategies, in TOWARDS A DEVELOPMENT-SUPPORTIVE DISPUTE SET-
TLEMENT SYSTEM IN THE WTO 1, 9 (Victor Mosoti ed., 2003).
78. Hansel T. Pham, Developing Countries and the WTO: The Need for More Media-
tion in the DSU, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 331, 347 (2004).
79. The DSU applies to the TRIPS Agreement with one limited exception-the treaty
temporarily exempts from the dispute resolution procedures complaints directed at actions
that deprive another state of the benefits of the TRIPS Agreement while adhering to WTO
obligations, called non-violation complaints. TRIPS Agreement art. 64; see TRIPS RE-
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 664, 669 (discussing the difference between violation and
non-violation complaints).
80. Pauwelyn, supra note 1, at 395 (noting that "the flood of IP disputes expected by
some did not materialize").
81. See DEERE, supra note 44, at 156-58.
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intellectual property policy making,82 external pressure such as media
campaigns and technical assistance,83 unilateral economic pressure,8 4 and
public engagement. 85 Nor does the availability of litigation explain deci-
sions to forgo transitional periods and implement the treaty ahead of
schedule. 86 At the same time, even those countries that had little reason to
fear WTO litigation experienced pressure from developed countries because
strong intellectual property laws in smaller states isolated "the larger, more
competitive and less-malleable developing countries" and made it easier to
marshal support for "TRIPS-plus" agreements.
Although it may not be possible to identify specific actions forgone by
developing countries because of the threat of a WTO complaint,88 the possi-
bility of litigation appears to have contributed to an overall culture of TRIPS
compliance. The United States, for example, saw its WTO complaint against
Brazil as a "'warning shot' . . . to the developing countries that had hopes
of using the flexibilities provided by the TRIPS Agreement."89 As Deere ex-
plains, "Even for countries not directly subjected to them, economic
pressures reinforced an international policy climate in which it was clear
that taking steps toward stronger IP protection would be favoured by power-
ful donors, foreign companies, and trading partners."90 In this way, the threat
of litigation and the possibility of WTO-authorized trade sanctions played a
critical role in creating a "pro-IP political climate for IP reforms." 91
82. See, e.g., id. at 197-232; Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-
First Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 Hous. L. REV. 1115,
1165-67 (2009); Yu, supra note 17, at 197.
83. See DEERE, supra note 44, at 167-86; Kapczynski, supra note 42, at 1574 (noting
that ratification of the TRIPS Agreement "inserts countries into a transnational circuit that
fills in the gaps in the Agreement and that works against the use of TRIPS flexibilities"). See
generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1995)
(arguing that treaty compliance depends on managerial processes such as reporting, monitor-
ing, and capacity building).
84. DEERE, supra note 44, at 151-55, 159-64, 306.
85. Id. at 312-13.
86. 1 am grateful to Joel Trachtman for this point. See also DEERE, supra note 44, at
306 (noting that some states that had never been "cited on the U.S. Special 301 list or subject
to a WTO dispute" enacted some of the strongest intellectual property laws).
87. DEERE, supra note 44, at 116.
88. Given how few intellectual property cases have been brought to the WTO, such
analysis may also be premature. Cf. Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95
AM. J. INT'L L. 792, 809 (2001) (arguing that "it is too soon to judge the efficacy of WTO
trade sanctions in inducing compliance" and that "the efficacy of sanctions should not be a
deciding factor in appraising the trade sanction tool").
89. Sangeeta Shashikant, The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health: An Im-
petus for Access to Medicines, in AccEss TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 141, 144 (Ga~lle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010).
90. DEERE, supra note 44, at 306.
91. See id. at 156-59.
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This "pro-IP" climate was exacerbated by the polarized rhetoric used by
proponents and opponents of strengthened intellectual property protections
worldwide. As Joost Pauwelyn argues, the perception of TRIPS as bad for
developing countries was in large part a result of spin by the intellectual
property lobby: "Upon the conclusion of TRIPS, IP industries touted the
agreement as a big victory that would widen and deepen worldwide IP
protection with little or no flexibility including for developing countries
once TRIPS entered into force for those countries on 1 January 2000.
'92
This refrain was taken up by many of the intellectual property skeptics,
who, in pushing back against the TRIPS Agreement, emphasized the per-
ceived inflexibility of TRIPS and the way in which it limited the ability of
developing countries to respond to domestic health crises. 93
Further, there is reason to think that developing and least developed
countries might be particularly sensitive to the threat of litigation. As Deere
notes, "[f]or trade-dependent, IP-importing developing countries, the pro-
spect that failure to implement TRIPS could result in trade retaliation is one
of the Agreement's most pernicious aspects." 94 Trade sanctions that result in
the withdrawal of concessions essential for domestic industries may be es-
pecially difficult for developing countries to bear.95 Developing nations also
may have access to less domestic legal expertise in the area of intellectual
property and fewer resources to initiate or defend against suits. 96 Because
they are less likely to be repeat players, developing nations also "benefit
from fewer economies of scale in deploying legal resources."97 They also
tend to encounter greater barriers in bringing disputes before the WTO,
largely stemming from the complexity of the system and procedures.98
92. Pauwelyn, supra note 1, at 425. This rhetoric was in tension with efforts to obtain
bilateral "TRIPS-plus" treaties that imposed higher standards than those of the TRIPS
Agreement. As Deere notes, developed countries felt that the TRIPS Agreement was not
strong enough and that additional measures were needed to ensure that developing nations
implemented strong intellectual property norms and did not make use of TRIPS flexibilities.
DEERE, supra note 44, at 113-14.
93. See Pauwelyn, supra note 1, at 425-26.
94. DEERE, supra note 44, at 65.
95. TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 682.
96. Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Par-
ticipates? Who Decides?, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 459, 472 (2004) (citing "the relatively high
cost of access to the system and developing countries' reduced economies of scale for mobi-
lizing legal resources"); id. at 475 (noting the "small supply of lawyers educated in WTO law
within developing countries"); cf Dinwoodie, supra note 20, at 509.
97. Shaffer, supra note 96, at 474.
98. Frieder Roessler, Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries Under
the WTO Dispute Settlement System, in THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003,
at 87, 88 (Federico Ortino & Emst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2004) (quoting Marc L. Busch &
Eric Reinhardt, Testing International Trade Law: Empirical Studies of GAT/WTO Dispute Set-
tlement, Paper Presented at the Conference on the Political Economy of International Trade
Law at the University of Minnesota Law School (Sept. 15-16, 2000)).
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In some respects, the caution of developing countries in applying man-
datory dispute resolution to the TRIPS Agreement appears to have been
unwarranted. Joost Pauwelyn explains that relatively few of the disputes
handled under the DSU have involved violations of the TRIPS Agreement,
and the number of such cases appears to be declining.99 Even fewer have in-
volved developing countries, and in none of these cases have sanctions been
imposed against developing countries. l'° Yet the lack of litigation may in
fact have exacerbated the pressures on states to forgo flexibilities, since the
absence of normative content with respect to many provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement increases the risk involved in testing the boundaries of the trea-
ty.10 This is particularly true for developing countries. The lack of cases
against developing countries means that "there has been no opportunity to
generate the norms that would provide developing countries with guidance
on what sorts of moves they can safely regard as compatible with interna-
tional obligations. 1 0 2 Finally, the fact that most TRIPS complaints have
been addressed to challenging a legal provision in domestic law instead of
its application to a particular context has heightened their signaling capaci-
ty: "It goes without saying that when such systemic complaints are won, a
strong warning signal is sent to the entire WTO. membership .... " "'
Further, the protection that developing countries hoped the DSU would
provide against unilateral economic pressure did not materialize."° The
WTO dispute settlement procedures were introduced in part to provide
greater oversight of and to limit the use of potentially opportunistic and ex-
cessive unilateral retaliation.0 5 Replacing unilateral with multilateral
sanctions would theoretically reduce the perceived risks associated with liti-
gation," 6 and developing countries had indeed hoped for less unilateral
pressure from the United States. 107 The United States, however, has continued
99. Pauwelyn, supra note 1, at 395-96; see Yoshifumi Fukunaga, Enforcing TRIPS:
Challenges of Adjudicating Minimum Standards Agreements, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 867,
884-87 (2008).
100. Pauwelyn, supra note 1, at 395, 418. At the same time, sanctions are only one
method-and not necessarily the most effective method-of enforcing compliance with in-
ternational treaties. E.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 83, at 33.
101. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 1214; Reichman, supra note 82, at 1132
(noting that "the risk of endless litigation over uncertain legal boundaries leads to daunting
litigation costs").
102. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Role of India, China, Brazil and Other Emerging
Economies in Establishing Access Norms for Intellectual Property and Intellectual Property
Lawmaking 7 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 09-53, 2009).
103. Pauwelyn, supra note 1, at 400.
104. See DEERE, supra note 44, at 159.
105. Warren F. Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation
and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S179, S202
(2002).
106. TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 686.
107. Kaiser, supra note 76, at 800.
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to employ its Special 301 process 1 8 and has successfully defended a chal-
lenge to the process as incompatible with TRIPS, although the impact of
this threat has been limited by the United States' position in that litigation
that it would not use this process in ways inconsistent with TRIPS. 10 9
B. The Incoherence of TRIPS Jurisprudence
By itself, concern about the threat of WTO dispute resolution might be
viewed as simply an ordinary consequence of the parties' bargain. Mandatory
dispute resolution is in fact intended to constrain the options available to states
and to encourage them to make changes in their domestic law consistent with
TRIPS. It was not, however, intended to constrain these options entirely. De-
veloping countries insisted on the inclusion of provisions in the TRIPS
Agreement to protect the policy space needed to tailor their laws to national
priorities. Yet WTO dispute resolution panels have interpreted these provisions
in ways that significantly restrict states' willingness and ability to take ad-
vantage of these flexibilities. ° In part, this may be a function of overly
legalistic reasoning in trade disputes generally. 1 1 In the context of intellectual
property, however, it is also a result of a mismatch between trade dispute reso-
108. Donald Harris, TRIPS After Fifteen Years: Success or Failure, as Measured by
Compulsory Licensing, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 373 (2011) (noting that the United States
has continued to use the 301 process despite the hopes of some developing countries that
"TRIPS would shield them from further United States unilateral action").
109. See Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
7.125-7.126, 7.131, 7.135, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) (finding that, although Section
304 constituted a prima facie violation of Article 23.2(a), the United States had expressed an
"unambiguous and official position" that prevented it "from making a determination of in-
consistency contrary to Article 23.2(a)," thus rendering Section 304 consistent with the
DSU).
110. Duncan Matthews notes, for example, that "there were doubts about whether Article
30 [of] TRIPS could in fact be used as a limited exception for the exportation of medicines to
non-producing developing countries," not only because of "strong opposition from the United
States and the research-based pharmaceutical industry," but also because "[t]he EC-Canada
WTO Dispute Settlement Panel had ... created uncertainties by stressing the limited nature of
exceptions to exclusive rights conferred by a patent under Article 30." DUNCAN MATTHEWS, IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF NGOs AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS 40-41 (2011) (citation omitted); see also Shaffer, supra note 96, at 471 (noting
that states operate in the "shadow" of the law, and the "WTO law's substance, as defined
through WTO jurisprudence, provides bargaining chips, informing and constraining settle-
ment negotiations").
111. See, e.g., Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, International Trade: Dispute Set-
tlement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 177, 208 (Andrew T.
Guzman & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 2007) ("[WTO] decisions are extremely deferential to the
words used in the WTO agreement, which are often read in clinical isolation from their con-
text, that is, without WTO judges asking, and answering, the question of what function any
given legal instrument has been assigned to play"); Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations
on the Dispute Settlement Understanding: Proposal by the LDC Group, 5, TN/DS/W/17
(Oct. 9, 2002) (reflecting concern that "[t]he panels and the Appellate Body have displayed
an excessively sanitized concern with legalisms, often to the detriment of the evolution of a
development-friendly jurisprudence").
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lution and intellectual property balancing. Situating intellectual property dis-
putes within a trade dispute resolution mechanism has led to jurisprudence
that is both internally incoherent and inconsistent with the goals of intellectual
property balancing and the proper interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement.
Several provisions in the text of the TRIPS Agreement were designed to
afford deference to national priorities in creating intellectual property poli-
cies. For example, Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement allows states to
limit copyright rights as long as the exception is confined to "certain special
cases" and does not "unreasonably prejudice" the rights of the intellectual
property owner." 2 Articles 17 and 30 contain similar terms (e.g., "legitimate
interests," "unreasonably conflict," and "unreasonably prejudice"). 1 13 In
the area of enforcement, Article 41 requires parties to ensure that enforce-
ment procedures "permit effective action.""' 4 Each of these terms would, on
its face, appear to require consideration of local conditions and the policy
goals the state sought to achieve through the exception. For example, the
term "special" would seem to call for an evaluation of whether the case is
unique or different in terms of, among other things, the purposes it is de-
signed to serve. A case is "special" if it is different from others, including
with reference to its objective or rationale. "Unreasonable" would appear to
require a comparison of the prejudice imposed on rights holders with the
public policy goals the state sought to achieve with the limitation. What
might constitute "unreasonable prejudice" under Article 13 in one context
could well be reasonable in another given important countervailing public
policy goals.
WTO panels, however, have nearly read these standard-type norms out
of the Agreement. In interpreting Article 13, for example, a WTO panel
adopted an interpretation of "special" that disregarded any consideration of
context. In U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright Act, the European Communities
challenged two provisions of U.S. law as violations of the TRIPS Agree-
ment.' Among other things, the United States argued that the challenged
exceptions conformed to Article 13, which allowed limitations and excep-
tions to rights provided they met the three-step test described above.'
Relying on the Oxford English Dictionary, the panel rejected the United
States' argument that the purpose of the exception should be considered in de-
termining whether a case is "special" enough to warrant an exception.' '17 The
panel defined the term "special" as requiring only that the exception "be
112. TRIPS Agreement art. 13. This is called the "three-step" test. See, e.g., CORREA,
supra note 31, at 146.
113. TRIPS Agreement arts. 17, 30.
114. Id. art. 41.
115. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,
WT/DS 1601R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright Act].
116. First Written Submission of the United States, U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright
Act, supra note 115, Attachment 2.1.
117. U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright Act, supra note 115, T 6.111.
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narrow in its scope and reach.""' 8 Although the panel noted that "public policy
purposes stated by law-makers when enacting a limitation or exception may
be useful," this was only to the extent such purposes would allow "infer-
ences about the scope of a limitation or exception."' !9 Similarly, in defining
"unreasonable prejudice," the panel considered primarily the amount of
economic harm to the rights owner and disregarded the purpose served by
the exception. 120 Thus, both "special" and "unreasonable" were defined by
the panel in ways that require consideration only of whether the exception
crosses some undefined economic threshold, not whether it was appropriate
in the local context. 121
One of the reasons the U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright Act panel adopt-
ed such a restrictive interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement was its reliance
on jurisprudence from trade cases to interpret Article 13.122 Although there
is technically no concept of "precedent" within the WTO system, "in practi-
cal terms, prior decisions are not lightly departed from."'123 Typically, this
118. Id. 6.112.
119. Id. (emphasis added). In other cases, however, panels have explicitly recognized
that
dictionaries are a "useful starting point" for the analysis of "ordinary meaning" of
a treaty term, but they are not necessarily dispositive. The ordinary meaning of a
treaty term must be ascertained according to the particular circumstances of each
case. Importantly, the ordinary meaning of a treaty term must be seen in the light
of the intention of the parties "as expressed in the words used by them against the
light of the surrounding circumstances."
Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, 7.559, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter China Intellectual
Property Rights] (citing Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Customs Classifi-
cation of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, T 175, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R (Sept.
12, 2005) [hereinafter EC-Chicken Cuts]).
120. U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright Act, supra note 115, 6.271.
121. See, e.g., Annette Kur, Limitations and Exceptions Under the Three-Step Test-
How Much Room to Walk the Middle Ground?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A
FAIR WORLD TRADE SYSTEM, supra note 21, at 208, 236 ("[W]ith the exception of the trade-
mark report, nowhere do the panels venture into a discussion of the policies underlying the
limitations at stake."); Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 1207 (characterizing the ad-
judicators in TRIPS cases as doing "little more than mechanically count[ing] the number of
rights within the bundle affected by the challenged provision, or the number of situations in
which the exception was applicable").
122. There may be, of course, several other reasons why panels have interpreted the
three-step test so narrowly. Rochelle Dreyfuss observes, for example, that most disputes
have involved developed countries, none of which have an incentive to argue for maximal
flexibility in the terms of the TRIPS Agreement. Dreyfuss, supra note 102, at 14-15. An-
nette Kur considers and rejects the argument that panels disregard context in order to
"preserve the evaluation of policy aspects to a later stage," arguing that this is "highly
questionable if an exception is already 'sorted out' with the first step, and therefore never
reaches a stage where policy considerations are included in the assessment." Kur, supra note
121, at 227.
123. Michael Lennard, Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreement, 5 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 17, 33 (2002). Panel decisions are not considered "subsequent practice" under
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reliance on prior decisions is not problematic. Panels adjudicating TRIPS
disputes often rely on decisions interpreting other covered agreements to es-
tablish general principles of treaty interpretation, 124 to interpret similar terms
in similar ways,125 or to identify general procedural approaches. 12 1 For ex-
ample, in EC-Trademarks and Geographical Indications, the panel
interpreted the phrase "no less favourable" in the TRIPS Agreement consist-
ently with the same phrase in Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT).1 27 Relying on decisions interpreting similar language in
other covered agreements is also consistent with Article 3 1(2)(a) of the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which allows
consideration of an "agreement relating to the treaty which was made be-
tween all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty. 128
Although reliance on prior decisions is unproblematic in many situa-
tions, the panel in U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright Act should not have used
trade cases to interpret Article 13 because of fundamental differences be-
tween the TRIPS Agreement and other WTO-covered agreements in their
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Appellate Body Report, Japan-
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 13-14, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS1O/AB/R, WT/DS1 I/AB/R
(Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II].
124. Appellate Body Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricul-
tural Chemical Products, T 46, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997); Panel Report, European
Communities-Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural
Products and Foodstuffs, 7.208, WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter EC-
Trademarks and Geographical Indications]; China-Intellectual Property Rights, supra note
119, 7.559.
125. Panel Report, European Communities-Protection of Trademarks and Geograph-
ical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 7.183, WT/DS2901R (Mar. 15,
2005). See generally Susy Frankel, The Applicability of GATT Jurisprudence to the Interpre-
tation of the TRIPS Agreement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE INTERPRETATION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER WTO RULES 3, 11-14 (Carlos M. Cor-
rea ed., 2010) (citing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-i1,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]) (detailing the use of GATT provisions to interpret na-
tional treatment and most-favored-nation provisions in TRIPS). Frankel, for example, has
argued that GATT jurisprudence is "relevant to the way in which concepts such as 'human,
animal or plant life or health' should be interpreted." Id. at 22.
126. China-Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 119, 7.141.
127. EC-Trademarks and Geographical Indications, supra note 124, 7.133. The
panel also stated:
The interpretation of the "no less favourable" treatment standard under other cov-
ered agreements may be relevant in interpreting Article 3.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement, taking account of its context in each agreement including, in particu-
lar, any differences arising from its application to like products or like services and
service suppliers, rather than to nationals.
Id. 7.135.
128. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter VCLT]; see Panel Report, United States-Transitional Safeguard Measure
on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan, 7.46, WT/DSI92/R (May 31, 2001) (noting, in in-
terpreting the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, that "it is the WTO Agreement in its
entirety, including GATT Article III, that provides the context of Article 6 of the ATC").
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approaches to national tailoring. Specifically, the panel in that case relied on
decisions of prior panels interpreting GATT and the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS). The critical provision of the U.S.-Section
110(5) Copyright Act decision states as follows:
As regards the parties' arguments on whether the public policy pur-
pose of an exception is relevant, we believe that the term "certain
special cases" should not lightly be equated with "special purpose." It
is difficult to reconcile the wording of Article 13 with the proposition
that an exception or limitation must be justified in terms of a legit-
imate public policy purpose in order to fulfill the first condition of
the Article. We also recall in this respect that in interpreting other
WTO rules, such as the national treatment clauses of the GA77 and
the GATS, the Appellate Body has rejected interpretative tests
which were based on the subjective aim or objective pursued by na-
tional legislation.'29
In this paragraph, the panel cites to cases interpreting GATT and GATS, in-
cluding the Appellate Body's decisions in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II
and EC-Bananas II1.130 In those cases, the Appellate Body rejected the use
of the "aims and effects" test in interpreting state obligations under
GATT.13 Article HI(l) of GATT prohibits discriminating against foreign
products "so as to afford protection" to domestic products. 32 States had ini-
tially argued that this meant that a discriminatory measure could only be
struck down if "a change in competitive opportunities in favour of domestic
products was a desired outcome and not merely an incidental consequence
of the pursuit of a legitimate policy goal."'33 In Japan-Alcoholic Beverages
II, however, the Appellate Body explicitly rejected this aims and effects test,
making clear that states were obligated to refrain from favoring domestic
products regardless of their motivation. 34 Affording preferential treatment
to domestic goods would violate national treatment even if the state's intent
were not protectionist. 31
129. U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright Act, supra note 115, 6.111 (emphasis added).
130. Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 123; Appellate Body Report, European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) [hereinafter EC-Bananas III].
131. Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 123, at 15-16; EC-Bananas IIl, supra
note 130, T 241.
132. GATT art. III(1).
133. Panel Report, United States-Taxes on Automobiles, [5.10, DS3 /R (Oct. 11,
1994). The panel report in United States-Taxes on Automobiles was never adopted. Panel
Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 6.18, WTIDS8/R, WT/DS IO/R, WT/DSI R
(Jul. 11, 1996).
134. Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 123, at 15-16.
135. Id. at 27. As the Appellate Body explained:
This is not an issue of intent. It is not necessary for a panel to sort through the
many reasons legislators and regulators often have for what they do and weigh the
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The different structures of the two treaties suggest panels should be
cautious about relying on general GATT jurisprudence in interpreting the
TRIPS Agreement. GATT sets out the parties' trade obligations and then
provides a general "escape clause" in Article XX that allows countries to
vary their obligations to fulfill domestic policy needs. Under Article XX of
GATT, states are allowed to adopt and enforce measures that are, among
other things, "necessary to protect public morals" or "human, animal or
plant life or health."' 36 Thus, in GATT jurisprudence, a panel first considers
whether a challenged state action is consistent with the state's trade obliga-
tions and only then, if it finds a violation, does it consider whether the
action is permitted under Article XX.' 37 Clearly separating these two steps
makes sense in the trade context. In GATT disputes, considering the pur-
pose of measures that favor domestic producers would eviscerate the
obligation, allowing states to escape liability by demonstrating lack of "intent"
to discriminate against foreign products-which would then devolve into
complex offers of proof regarding a state's alleged intent. Such an approach
would be unworkable in the context of trade, where clear rules provide the
predictability needed to ensure the efficient functioning of the global trading
system. The state's intent is only relevant later, when considering whether the
exception was enacted for a lawful purpose.
The TRIPS Agreement is structured quite differently. Instead of a
general escape clause, state parties integrated policy exceptions into the
structure and language of the agreement itself. In other words, while
GATT provides a system of separate obligations and exceptions, policy
flexibility is incorporated directly into the obligations of the TRIPS
Agreement. Standard-type norms and explicit exceptions appear through-
out the treaty. Two articles specifically directed toward balancing, Articles
7 and 8, are located in Part I of the treaty, entitled "General Provisions and
Basic Principles."' 38 This integrated flexibility is essential to intellectual
property, an area of law that justifies granting limited monopolies on inven-
tions and cultural goods in order to achieve larger societal goals such as
relative significance of those reasons to establish legislative or regulatory intent. If
the measure is applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection
to domestic production, then it does not matter that there may not have been any
desire to engage in protectionism in the minds of the legislators or the regulators
who imposed the measure. It is irrelevant that protectionism was not an intended
objective ....
Id.
136. GATT art. XX.
137. Henning Grosse Ruse-Kahn, Assessing the Need for a General Public Interest Ex-
ception in the TRIPS Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A FAIR WORLD
TRADE SYSTEM, supra note 21, at 167, 187 ("Drafted as a defense, Art.XX GATT comes into
play only if a national measure has been found in violation of an obligation under the
GATT.").
138. TRIPS Agreement pt. I.
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fostering innovation and incentivizing creation.'39 Panels should be cautious
about incorporating GATT approaches into an agreement that so thoroughly
integrates policy flexibility.14
More precisely, however, reliance on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages I in
U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright Act can be understood as a problem of the
right thing in the wrong place. It may in fact be appropriate to rely on GATT
jurisprudence at certain points in a TRIPS analysis, but doing so to reject
consideration of context in interpreting Article 13 inappropriately imports a
legal construct designed to achieve one kind of objective into another meant
to do something very different. In evaluating state compliance, both TRIPS
and GATT generally anticipate a two-step process-a finding of a violation
followed by consideration of exception clauses. Although policy flexibility
is integrated throughout rather than presented through a general escape
clause, TRIPS adjudicators evaluating exceptions and limitations still must
first establish a violation and then determine whether the violation is a per-
mitted exception or limitation. 4 ' Under both treaties, the first step focuses
simply on the existence of the violation without regard to policy, while the
second is designed to evaluate whether the exception is permitted in light of
the purposes it was designed to achieve. In U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright
Act, however, the panel imported jurisprudence from a GATT first step into
a TRIPS second step. The panel took jurisprudence from a case evaluating
the existence of a violation under GATT, which reasonably excludes con-
sideration of intent, into the second step of a TRIPS analysis.'42 The result
was to eliminate policy flexibility in this second step and thereby to remove
139. See, e.g., MARGRETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS
2 (3d ed., 2007) ("The primary purpose of intellectual property law is to ensure a rich, di-
verse and competitive marketplace."); CRAIG ALLEN NARD ET AL., THE LAW OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 13 (2d ed., 2008) ("Copyrights and patents are something tolerat-
ed for the greater societal good."). Although the natural or moral rights traditions are in some
tension with instrumentalist theories of intellectual property, the TRIPS Agreement-which
rejects protection of moral rights, see TRIPS Agreement art. 9(l), and specifies the purposes
intellectual property rights are intended to serve, see id. pmbl. & arts. 7 & 8-would appear
to lean more toward the latter than the former.
140. Even in GATT cases, commentators have argued that more consideration of con-
text and a more reasoned approach to balancing are warranted. See, e.g., Horn & Mavroidis,
supra note 11, at 208 (noting that WTO decisions "are often read in clinical isolation from
their context"); Gregory Shaffer & Joel Trachtman, Interpretation and Institutional Choice at
the WTO, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 103, 142 (2011) (critiquing the panels' approach to balancing,
noting that in one leading case, the Appellate Body appeared "to proceed by a kind of ge-
stalt," and that in others, it avoided balancing entirely).
141. See, e.g., U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright Act, supra note 115, 6.13 (observing
that the "European Communities bears the burden of establishing a prima facie violation of
the basic rights that have been provided under the copyright provisions of the TRIPS Agree-
ment, including its provisions that have been incorporated by reference from the Berne
Convention" and that "once the European Communities has succeeded in doing so, the
burden rests with the United States to establish that any exception or limitation is applicable
and that the conditions, if any, for invoking such exception are fulfilled").
142. See id. 6.111.
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consideration of policy concerns from the system of exceptions and limita-
tions in TRIPS. 143
In eliminating policy considerations, the interpretation of Article 13 in
U. S.-Section 110(5) Copyright Act is contrary to the text and structure of
the treaty and the nature of intellectual property decision making itself.
Based solely on the language of the treaty, the phrase "certain special cases"
calls for, among other things, consideration of whether the purposes served
by the exception make the case "special" or "different" from other cases."
Indeed, the U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright Act panel itself defined "spe-
cial" as "distinctive in some way," thus inviting comparison between cases,
and stated that as a result, "an exception or limitation should be the opposite
of a non-special, i.e., a normal case."' 145 This implicit invitation to consider
purpose is difficult to harmonize with the panel's conclusion that the term
"special cases" simply means exceptions that are "clearly defined" and "nar-
row in ... scope and reach."' 4 6
The interpretive rules chosen by the parties provide additional support
for the argument that they intended the panels to consider context, thereby
engaging in some balancing of public and private interests. As Professors
Shaffer and Trachtman observe, "states may choose to instruct judges on
how to exercise their authority, or they may leave the choice over interpre-
tive rules to the judges." '47 In the case of the covered agreements, the parties
specified interpretive rules. In Article 3(2) of the DSU, members recognize
that the WTO dispute settlement system "serves ... to clarify the existing
provisions of those [covered] agreements in accordance with customary
rules of interpretation of public international law." 148 Article 31(1) of the
VCLT, which codifies customary norms of interpretation, 149 provides that
"[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of
its object and purpose."1 0 By choosing customary rules of interpretation,
the parties to the TRIPS Agreement can be assumed to have intended the
panels to consider the ordinary meaning of the treaty's terms in light of its
object and purpose, including as that object and purpose is laid out in
143. A more appropriate approach would be to use GATT Article XX jurisprudence to
interpret TRIPS exceptions and limitations, since these are the respective locations of policy
space under these treaties. See infra note 218.
144. See Kur, supra note 121, at 228 ("The decisive question to be asked in light of fur-
ther elements to be investigated on the following steps would then be whether the exception
is limited enough in view of its purpose and potential impact.").
145. U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright Act, supra note 115, 6.109.
146. Id. 6.112.
147. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 140, at 114.
148. DSU art. 3(2).
149. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 140, at 115.
150. VCLT, supra note 128, art. 3 1(1).
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Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS.15' It is unclear why the U.S.-Section 110(5)
Copyright Act panel rejected consideration of context when these articles
emphasize the importance of the purposes intellectual property policies
serve. It is particularly surprising in light of panel and Appellate Body reli-
ance on object and purpose in other cases.'
The panel's rejection of approaches that consider context and purpose
in interpreting the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement reflects a misappre-
hension of the task of adjudicators in intellectual property disputes. In the
TRIPS Agreement, a good bit of "legislating" has been delegated to the ad-
judicators. Many of its provisions are "incomplete" contracts-"vaguely
specified provisions" that leave the exact scope of obligation "to be decided
in the future, when a conflict arises.""' The task of completing the contract
is left to the adjudicators, and states must "accept the outcome of the ruling
as the outcome of the unfinished negotiation."'54 As Frederick Abbott
explains, "[t]he TRIPS Agreement was designed to permit a substantial
measure of national discretion in its implementation, and adjudicators will
not find the broadly drafted provisions of the agreement perfectly instructive
in some contexts."'155
Indeed, this gap-filling function is in many ways required by the nature
of intellectual property itself. Intellectual property disputes require balanc-
ing, since the benefits associated with the limited monopoly granted to
rights holders must always be weighed against the externalities that this
monopoly can create. 5 6 The provisions of TRIPS allowing exceptions and
151. Article 7, for example, specifies that intellectual property regulation should con-
tribute to innovation and technology transfer in ways "conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations." TRIPS Agreement art. 7.
152. See, e.g., EC-Chicken Cuts, supra note 119, 1$ 175, 192, 236-250; Japan-
Alcoholic Beverages 11, supra note 123, at 11.
153. Horn & Mavroidis, supra note I 1, at 184.
154. Id. at 185.
155. Frederick M. Abbott, WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to the Agreement
on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, in THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
1995-2003, supra note 98, at 421, 421; see also MATTHIAS OESCH, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
IN WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 47 (2003) ("[O]pen-textured provisions ... may by nature
require to be loosely interpreted and thus may result in some leeway being given to national
authorities in the perception of their obligations."); Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 27, at 61-
65 (arguing that ambiguous provisions in the TRIPS Agreement should be interpreted more
flexibly and with respect to the treaty's object and purpose).
156. Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Phi-
losophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1327 (2003) ("The nature of intellectual
property requires congressional balancing between copyright holders' interests and other so-
cietal interests."); see also Jon 0. Newman, Considering Copyright, 40 Hous. L. REV. 613,
615 (2003). Jon Newman, for example, explains:
The dominant issue in all of copyright law is striking an appropriate balance be-
tween the maintenance of an adequate incentive for authors to create new works
and the vital interest of the public in having adequate access to the works that are
created-limited access via the fair use doctrine during the copyright term and
general access once the work has entered the public domain.
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limitations reflect this need for balance, calling on states to create monopoly
rights but giving them options for limiting such rights when necessary to
protect other interests. To fully exercise its supervisory function, the WTO
dispute resolution system must have the capacity to engage in this balancing
as well to determine whether the state was justified in its decision-making
process. To interpret the scope of protection under TRIPS, adjudicators must
balance the public and private interests affected by copyright in light of the
object and purpose of the treaty.
The failure to understand the gap-filling nature of the adjudicator's task
in interpreting the TRIPS Agreement may explain in part panels' reluctance
to rely on Articles 7 and 8. Although panels have discussed Articles 7 and 8,
they have not relied on these provisions directly in interpreting the provi-
sions of the TRIPS Agreement, despite the fact that the VCLT provides that
the terms of a treaty should be interpreted in light of the treaty's object and
purpose. 5 7 Instead, the WTO bodies appear to have assumed that the provi-
sions of TRIPS already reflect an appropriate balance between competing
concerns. As Susy Frankel argues, panels "look at particular provisions of
the Agreement and seem to interpret them as if they incorporate a balance
that does not require any additional consideration." '158 As a result, panels in-
appropriately assume that in interpreting the scope of protection required
by the terms of the treaty, there is no need to balance the innovation gains
to be achieved by these provisions with the public interests articulated in
Articles 7 and 8. For some provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, this is a
reasonable assumption. The requirement in the TRIPS Agreement that
countries should protect patents for twenty years (as opposed to fifteen or
five or thirty) does in fact reflect the parties' agreement on the appropriate
balance between patent rights and other social values. For other provisions of
the Agreement, however, this balance can only be achieved on a case-by-case
basis.' 159 Article 13, for example, describes generally the kinds of exceptions
Id. This "tailoring" of domestic innovation policies is one of the several vectors of balancing
identified by Graeme Dinwoodie. Graeme Dinwoodie, The WIPO Copyright Treaty: A Tran-
sition to the Future of International Copyright Lawmaking?, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 751,
754-58 (2007).
157. See Susy Frankel, WTO Application of "'the Customary Rules of Interpretation of
Public International Law" to Intellectual Property, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 396-97 (2006);
see also Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 727, 768 ("Although WTO panel reports have applied Articles 7 and 8 on occasion,
their application has remained limited, and the two provisions deserve greater attention from
both the DSB and members participating in the WTO dispute settlement process.").
158. Susy Frankel, Some Consequences of Misinterpreting the TRIPS Agreement,
2009 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. J. 35, 40; see also Frankel, supra note 125, at 11 & n.33
("Panels seem to assume that such a balance has already been dealt with in setting down
the standard. This approach, however, ignores the interpretative role of Articles 7 and 8.");
Frankel, supra note 157, at 397 ("The Panel seems to have suggested that the individual
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement reflect the balance and that no other consideration of
object and purpose needs to be undertaken.").
159. See, e.g., Grosse Ruse-Kahn, supra note 137, at 202-04 (discussing how some
provisions of a treaty are more concrete than others and that more ambiguous "provisions
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and limitations that are permitted under the Agreement. In applying this provi-
sion, it is up to panels and the Appellate Body to determine the appropriate
balance based on the facts of each individual case. The need for case-by-case
balancing is one of the reasons that the mechanical and formalist reasoning of
WTO panels is inappropriate in the TRIPS context. 60
In contrast to the decision in U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright Act, a re-
cent decision in a case brought by the United States against China for
violations of the enforcement obligations of the TRIPS Agreement appears
to endorse panel consideration of context in ways favorable to developing
countries.' 6' Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement requires parties to criminal-
ize infringing activities that occur "on a commercial scale."'162 Relying on
Article 1(1), the panel held that TRIPS did not require any particular form
of enforcement legislation and that a member will have complied with its
obligations as long as it "in fact provides for criminal procedures and penal-
ties to be applied." 163 The panel continued: "If it is alleged that a Member's
method of implementation does not so provide in such cases, that allegation
must be proven with evidence."'" The panel held that the United States had
not presented sufficient evidence concerning what constitutes activity on a
commercial scale in the relevant markets in China.'65 Thus, at least in inter-
preting Article 41, it appears that panels will consider context in evaluating
what is considered "commercial scale."
Although a promising step, it is unclear whether this consideration of
context will translate into more deferential approaches in cases involving
exceptions and limitations. In China-Intellectual Property Rights, the
panel sought facts about the market, not information about the public inter-
ests affected by intellectual property regulation. Making evidence-based
determinations about the nature of commercial markets is precisely the kind
of thing trade panels do on a regular basis. The panel may have felt more
comfortable making this kind of determination than deciding whether a lim-
itation to copyright was necessary in order to protect social or expressive
incorporating broad and open legal concepts ... will not only lend themselves to, but de-
mand an interpretation which draws heavily on, the object and purpose of the international
agreement at stake").
160. See, e.g., Kur, supra note 121, at 246 ("[A] mode of interpretation which foreclos-
es any possibility for policy aspects being taken into account is not compatible with the
object and purpose of TRIPS, as affirmed in the Doha Declaration.").
161. See Dreyfuss, supra note 102, at 16 (arguing that the panel in the China-
Intellectual Property Rights case demonstrated greater deference to China's authority than
other intellectual property cases decided under the auspices of the WTO); Yu, supra note
157, at 744 (arguing that the decision "recognizes the flexibilities retained in the TRIPS
Agreement" and "underscores the autonomy and policy space reserved for less developed
countries during the TRIPS negotiations").
162. TRIPS Agreement art. 61.
163. China-Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 119, TT 7.601-.602.
164. Id.
165. Id. TT 7.614-.629.
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values. Thus, the potential influence of the decision may be more limited
outside the enforcement context.
III. DESIGNING A STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR IP CASES
Linking intellectual property regulation to the trade dispute mechanism
of the WTO has played a significant role in limiting flexibilities protected
under the TRIPS Agreement. In part, this is due to the availability of manda-
tory dispute resolution, which has contributed to a culture of intellectual
property overcompliance. This effect has been compounded by the use of
interpretive approaches drawn from the trade context. Using trade ap-
proaches to interpret the TRIPS Agreement, which is structured very
differently, has had the effect of nullifying those portions of the TRIPS
Agreement that support the creation of balanced intellectual property pro-
tection.
This Part argues that an IP-specific standard of review would help re-
store the balance envisioned by the TRIPS Agreement. Why a standard of
review? The previous Part argued that panels should consider the purpose of
exceptions and limitations to intellectual property rights in evaluating their
consistency with the treaty. There are, however, a number of decisions about
the allocation of interpretive authority necessarily bound up in such an en-
deavor, including who decides what the purpose is, whether that purpose is
a legitimate one, and, at least in the context of copyright, whether the articu-
lated purpose indeed makes the case "special." Standards of review allocate
interpretive authority.166 A standard of review tailored to the demands of in-
tellectual property balancing will help guide panels in evaluating public
policy justifications for exceptions and limitations, allowing them to provide
appropriate deference to state policies while nonetheless exercising the su-
pervisory authority vested in them by the TRIPS Agreement.
The appropriate standard of review to be used for any covered agree-
ment must depend on the text of the treaty, read in light of its object and
purpose, and the relative competences of local and international decision
makers. In light of the text of the TRIPS Agreement and institutional and
structural concerns, a standard of review for intellectual property cases
should defer to national decision making in evaluating exceptions and limi-
tations to intellectual property rights.
A. Standards of Review at the WTO
During the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement, developing and devel-
oped countries disagreed strongly about the standard of review that WTO
adjudicators should use with respect to complaints about violations of the
166. Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution, 6 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 635, 636 (2003) (explaining that standards of review "express a deliber-
ate allocation of power between an authority taking a measure and a judicial organ reviewing
it").
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TRIPS Agreement. Developed countries sought a stringent standard. Judith
Bello, who was involved in the negotiations on behalf of the U.S. govern-
ment, recalls that the Bush administration's position with respect to TRIPS
"was to empower dispute settlement panelists to scrutinize the measures
or practices complained of closely, without undue deference for the mem-
ber state's findings or determinations underlying them."'167 Developing
countries, on the other hand, wanted to cabin the authority of the dispute
settlement bodies, arguing that because the TRIPS Agreement required
members to limit their sovereignty "more severely than the passive provi-
sions" of the other covered agreements, it was necessary to provide a
standard of review "as to the prerequisites under which a panel or the Ap-
pellate Body was obliged to respect decisions of the Members. '168
For better or worse, this dispute was never resolved. Members were
able to settle on a standard of review for only one of the WTO-covered
agreements-the Antidumping Agreement. 169 They were not able to agree
on a standard of review for the TRIPS Agreement or any other covered
agreement. Oesch and Bello argue that the fact that the parties agreed on a
standard of review for one agreement but not others means that they did not
intend the panels to defer to state decision making with respect to other
types of disputes. 170 More likely, however, failure to agree on a standard of
review for disputes under the TRIPS Agreement is simply that-a failure to
agree. Since panels would inevitably need to address the appropriate stand-
ard of review, failure to agree on such a standard would appear to indicate a
decision to delegate to the panels the authority to answer this question.' 7 '
167. Judith H. Bello, Some Practical Observations About WTO Settlement of Intellectu-
al Property Disputes, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 357, 362 (1997). With respect to WTO cases in
general, states sought "broad review authority" in order to "prevent domestic governments
from applying GATT/WTO rules illegitimately to protect domestic industries." OESCH, supra
note 155, at 75. There was also a concern among states that a deferential standard of review
"would necessarily have led to different interpretive approaches as to the meaning of the
rules and obligations and thus reduce consistency in the GATTIWTO legal framework." Id.;
see also Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Panel Deference to National
Government Decisions: The Misplaced Analogy to the U.S. Chevron Standard-of-Review
Doctrine, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYS-
TEM 187, 194 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997).
168. Kaiser, supra note 76, at 805; see also Henning Grosse Ruse-Kahn, Proportionali-
ty and Balancing Within the Objectives for Intellectual Property Protection, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 161, 169 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2008)
(observing that it may be particularly important to have a regime that takes account of all in-
terests affected where the intrusion into domestic policies is significant, particularly when
accompanied by strong and effective mechanisms of implementation).
169. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, art. 17.6, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IA, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201; see also Bello, supra note 167, at 363.
170. OESCH, supra note 155, at 54, 75-76, 79; Bello, supra note 167, at 362-63.
171. The principle of non liquet generally counsels against the filling of gaps by adju-
dicatory bodies. Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive,
Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 258 (2004); see also
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In the absence of explicit agreement on a standard of review, WTO pan-
els have looked to Article 11 of the DSU 7 2 for guidance. This article
provides that a panel "should make an objective assessment of the matter
before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the
applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements"' 73
Article 11 was not likely intended to provide a standard of review; rather, it
appears to have been designed to establish basic due process rights for liti-
gants and "merely requires that there be no bias applied to the adopted
standard."'74 Nonetheless, panels have used this provision to develop a
standard of review to be applied in cases other than the Antidumping
Agreement.'75 Under the "objective assessment" required by Article 11,
panels and the Appellate Body make independent determinations on legal
questions. 17 6 The level of review with respect to factual and policy questions
differs for each covered agreement. 7 7 The panels and Appellate Body have
adopted a fairly stringent level of review with respect to most factual ques-
tions, "'78 although they are somewhat more deferential to some types of
decisions involving judgment or political assessment. 179
B. The Special Case of Intellectual Property
The WTO adjudicatory bodies have not articulated an explicit standard
of review for intellectual property cases. By default, however, their ap-
proach in intellectual property cases seems to have been one of de novo re-
review. By refusing to consider the reasons states offer for the domestic
Frankel, supra note 157, at 393-94 ("[Wh]ere the treaty does not favor one object or purpose
over another, interpreters of the treaty should not fill the gap and favor one objective."). On
the other hand, the absence of a standard might also "reflect a desire by the signatory nations
to leave tough decisions to other institutional arrangements (such as WTO panels) that are
subjected to, or insulated from, different political or other pressures." Dinwoodie, supra note
20, at 504. With respect to the standard of review, gap filling seems inevitable if the panels
are to fulfill their intended role. Cf Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Propor-
tionality's New Frontier, 4 LAW & ETHICs HUM. RTS. 47, 55 n.19 (2010) (discussing the
principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, which presumes that an arbitrator has the competence
"to determine its own jurisdiction, or the jurisdiction of another organ").
172. OESCH, supra note 155, at 75.
173. DSU art. 11.
174. Andrew T. Guzman, Determining the Appropriate Standard of Review in 1TO
Disputes, 42 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 45, 50-51 (2009).
175. See OESCH, supra note 155, at 83-85.
176. Guzman, supra note 174, at 59; see also OESCH, supra note 155, at 174; Claus-
Dieter Ehlermann & Nicolas Lockhart, Standard of Review in WTO Law, 7 J. INT'L EcON. L.
491, 519-20 (2004).
177. See, e.g., SHARIF BHUIYAN, NATIONAL LAW IN WTO LAW 192 (2007); Ehlermann
& Lockhart, supra note 176, at 519-20.
178. Guzman, supra note 174, at 61-63. See generally OESCH, supra note 155, at 119-
26, 133-42 (discussing the standard of review panels and the Appellate Body apply to the
examination of "raw" factual evidence and factual conclusions).
179. Guzman, supra note 174, at 64-67.
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intellectual property policies they enact, the panels appear to have deter-
mined that no deference is warranted with respect to national decision
making. Further, in considering the "legitimate interests" of patent owners
and third parties in Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, the panel reserved
to itself the authority to determine what interests are "legitimate," holding
that these interests must be "compelling" and "widely recognized" and
finding that the interests of the patent owners in the circumstances pre-
sented did not meet that standard. 8 ' As Joost Pauwelyn argues, even if
this were a convincing interpretation with respect to the interests of patent
owners, it is not clear the panel reached the right decision about who
should determine the legitimacy of third party interests:
The same way WTO members have the sovereign right to decide on
their own level of health or environmental protection under GATT
Article XX exceptions, it should be for WTO members themselves
to decide on the nature and extent of these countervailing interests
(confirmed, inter alia, in TRIPS Articles 7 and 8), even if it may
then ultimately be up to a WTO panel to balance these interests
against the interests of IP right holders under TRIPS exceptions. 8'
Thus, the standard of review adopted by the panels thus far in intellectual
property cases appears to be de novo. Such a standard will not be appropri-
ate in every situation. The challenge for panels, then, is to determine the
level of deference required under the terms of the treaty (including for dif-
ferent provisions of the treaty), in light of the treaty's object and purpose
and the relative advantages of local and international decision making.
As an initial matter, it is important to note that different standards of re-
view may be needed across and even within individual covered agreements.
In the EC-Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products case, for example,
the panel explained that the appropriate standard of review "depends on the
concrete question at issue and the provisions of WTO law on which a claim
is based," noting that the balance between sovereignty and the jurisdiction
of the panel "is expressed differently in different provisions of the covered
agreement.' 1 82 Thus, to the extent that panels develop a standard of review
for TRIPS cases, this standard must be tailored to the particular demands of
180. Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 7.82,
WT/DSll4/R (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents] (finding
that the patent owner's interest in being compensated for limits on the effective term of a
patent caused by the need for regulatory review "was neither so compelling nor so widely
recognized that it could be regarded as a 'legitimate interest' within the meaning of Arti-
cle 30 of the TRIPS Agreement").
181. Pauwelyn, supra note 1, at 411-12.
182. Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Mar-
keting of Biotech Products, 114.1000-.1001, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R
(Sep. 29, 2006) [hereinafter EC-Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products]; see also
Guzman, supra note 174, at 52 ("Article 11 does not, cannot, and should not prescribe a sin-
gle standard of review for all cases.").
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the individual provisions of the treaty in light of the division of national and
international authority they envision.
Several scholars have addressed the question of how much deference
WTO bodies should give to national decision making, both in general'83 and
in the context of intellectual property.'84 Broadly, there are three types of
considerations relevant to the proper standard of review to be used by inter-
national adjudicatory institutions: the terms of the treaty (viewed in light of
the treaty's object and purpose), the relative institutional strengths of panels
versus states in creating intellectual property policy, and systemic concerns
about panel accountability.
First, the level of scrutiny exercised by international adjudicatory bodies
must reflect the intent of the parties as manifested in the terms of the treaty.
As Susy Frankel argues, panels should defer to national laws "only in
those areas where the parties intended to leave the agreement open-
textured to allow national interests."'85 Although WTO members did not
agree on an overall standard of review for decisions under the TRIPS
Agreement, individual provisions do provide guidance. Many of the
TRIPS Agreement's obligations are clear and quantifiable, such as the ob-
ligation on member states to provide a twenty-year patent term. 86 In such
instances, no deference is required. Panels need only ascertain whether
the patent term meets the international standard. 87 In other instances, how-
ever, deference is built into the terms of the treaty itself. Terms such as
"special" (in Article 13), "unreasonabl[e]" (in Articles 13 and 30), and "le-
gitimate" (in Articles 13, 17, and 30) are standard-type norms that Yuval
Shany has argued warrant particular deference to national decision mak-
ing.'88 When the obligations in the treaty impose context-specific standards
183. See, e.g., OESCH, supra note 155, at 47; Croley & Jackson, supra note 167, at 208-
10; Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 140, at 147.
184. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the
Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275,
286-97 (1997); Frankel, supra note 157, at 393-94; Laurence R. Heifer, Adjudicating Copy-
right Claims Under the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy,
39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357, 432 (1998).
185. Frankel, supra note 157, at 393-94; see also id. at 428-29 ("[D]eference is appro-
priate where to do otherwise would ignore the intentions of the parties shown in the
Agreement.").
186. TRIPS Agreement art. 33.
187. This is not to suggest that evaluating compliance with the patent term requirement
will always be simple, only that the treaty vests authority to make this determination in the
panel, not the state. See Appellate Body Report, Canada-Term of Patent Protection,
WT/DS 170/AB/R (Sept. 18, 2000).
188. Shany, supra note 38, at 914-15; see also Grosse Ruse-Kahn, supra note 137, at
173, 203-04 ("TRIPS can be interpreted and-more importantly-implemented in [a] man-
ner which should offer a similar amount of policy space for domestic regulation of public
interests.").
Spring 2012]
Michigan Journal of International Law
such as these rather than specific outcomes, panels should allow states to
demonstrate why those standards are met.189
Deference to national determinations where the text of the treaty indi-
cates such deference is warranted is also consistent with other provisions
and subsequent interpretations of the treaty. Article 1(t) of the TRIPS
Agreement provides that members "shall be free to determine the appropri-
ate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their
own legal system and practice.""'9 Paragraph 4 of the Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted in conjunction with the 2001
Doha ministerial conference, recognizes the flexibility that member states
retain with respect to implementation and "affirm[s] that the Agreement can
and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO
members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access
to medicines for all." 191 Such deference is also consistent with the DSU it-
self, which states that the "fr]ecommendations and rulings of the [Dispute
Settlement Body] cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations pro-
vided in the covered agreements. 1 92
Second, the standard of review must take into account the relative
strengths and weaknesses of international versus national decision making.
As Andrew Guzman has argued, a standard of review is fundamentally a
balance between "the need for objectivity" and "the informational ad-
vantage member states possess."'9 3 He explains further that with respect to
standards of review for WTO-covered agreements,
189. Under the current jurisprudence of the panels, after the complaining state estab-
lishes a prima facie case that the defending state has violated a provision of the TRIPS
Agreement, the burden shifts to the defending state to demonstrate that the challenged action
was permitted under one of the exceptions and limitations protected under the Agreement.
See, e.g., Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, supra note 180, T 7.16 (holding that once the EC
demonstrated a prima facie case of violation, the burden shifted to Canada "to demonstrate
that the provisions of Sections 55.2(1) and 55.2(2) comply with the criteria laid down in Ar-
ticle 30"); U.S.-Section 110(5) Copyright Act, supra note 115, 6.10 (noting that "it is for
the European Communities to present a prima facie case that Section 110(5)(A) and (B) of
the US Copyright Act is inconsistent with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement" but that
"the burden of proving that any exception or limitation is applicable and that any relevant
conditions are met falls on the United States as the party bearing the ultimate burden of proof
for invoking exceptions").
190. TRIPS Agreement art. 1(1). Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss characterize this provision as
"restat[ing] a fundamental assumption of the international intellectual property system: in-
ternational norms confine national policy choices, but they do not define them." Dinwoodie
& Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 1217.
191. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 48, 4. The
Declaration can be considered a subsequent interpretation of the obligations contained in the
TRIPS Agreement. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 155, at 445-46 (arguing that the Doha Dec-
laration may be applied as an interpretive source); Yu, supra note 6, at 999-1000 (arguing
that the Declaration may have an impact on subsequent panel interpretations).
192. DSU art. 3(2); see also id. art. 19(2).
193. Guzman, supra note 174, at 47-48.
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[t]he simple tradeoff between expertise and neutrality can and
should guide the determination of appropriate standards of review.
On the one hand, where it is possible to evaluate relevant facts us-
ing objective criteria and without reference to domestic priorities,
panels and the [Appellate Body] should apply a high level of re-
view. Where, on the other hand, there is little risk of bias and a
decision requires a great deal of local knowledge, there should be
deference to domestic policymakers. In the large number of cases
that lie between these two extremes, the standard of review should
reflect the relative importance of neutrality and domestic exper-
tise. 194
In the context of intellectual property, many of the decisions panels
face will present a significant need for local knowledge, thus counseling a
more deferential standard of review. For example, with respect to the
standard-type norms of Articles 13, 17, and 30, there is a significant need
for local information concerning the nature of the exception, its effect on
the rights holder, and the reasons for its implementation. As Yuval Shany
has argued, judicial deference is particularly appropriate in such instances
of normative uncertainty that require "fact-intensive law-application deci-
sions."'195 As several commentators have noted, WTO adjudicatory bodies
are not well placed to engage in fact finding.' 96 Tailoring a domestic intel-
lectual property policy also requires consideration of a range of values not
necessarily within the mandate of the WTO, and states-not subject to such
limitations-may be better suited to consider these values. 197
Unlike other WTO-covered agreements, the object and purpose of the
TRIPS Agreement also renders less acute the risk of protectionism, thus
moderating concerns about biased decision making. The TRIPS Agreement
differs from other covered agreements because it recognizes that states can,
and indeed should, act in ways that are protective of national interests. The
preamble and articles of the TRIPS Agreement make clear that intellectual
property policy must fulfill dual objectives-not only facilitating trade but
also contributing to national goals. The preamble recognizes, for example,
that there are public policy objectives underlying national intellectual prop-
erty systems and that these objectives include development. 198 Article 7
194. Id. at 75.
195. Shany, supra note 38, at 913.
196. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the "World Trade Court," in
THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003, supra note 98, at 499, 500; OESCH,
supra note 155, at 56; Croley & Jackson, supra note 167, at 205.
197. Dinwoodie, supra note 20, at 511 (noting that the economic orientation of trade
law and the WTO dispute process in general means its jurisprudence on intellectual property
"might thus develop without full reference to the full set of values that inform its develop-
ment in national courts throughout the world").
198. TRIPS Agreement pmbl. ("Recognizing the underlying public policy objectives of
national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and
technological objectives ....").
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emphasizes that intellectual property policies "should contribute to the pro-
motion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology."' 99 Article 7 also notes that intellectual property laws should
promote innovation to benefit both producers and users "in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare."2 °0 Thus, the TRIPS Agreement
explicitly recognizes that states can and should act in ways that protect and
foster domestic interests.
2 0 1
The risks of protectionist conduct are also lower in the intellectual
property context because of the more conflicted relationship between in-
tellectual property and trade. Intellectual property is unique among the
covered agreements because it can both facilitate and undermine interna-
tional trade. As Susy Frankel explains, the TRIPS Agreement is designed
to protect markets, while GATT and GATS are designed to liberalize access
to markets. 2 2 Failure to protect intellectual property can pose a trade barrier
if it limits the willingness of foreign investors to invest in a particular coun-
try. Intellectual property rights can also be seen as inhibiting trade, however,
because they can prevent foreign producers from freely selling their goods
on the market. The preamble of the TRIPS Agreement itself states that the
WTO members desire "to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce
intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate
trade."203 Because of the more ambiguous connection between intellectual
property and trade, domestic intellectual property policies that have the ef-
fect of restraining trade are not necessarily in tension with the object and
purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. 20
4
Third, there are overall systemic concerns that counsel a more deferen-
tial approach to interpreting the TRIPS Agreement. Tailoring domestic
intellectual property policies to respond to local needs and concerns often
requires making trade-offs between public policy goals-trade-offs that are
most legitimate when made by bodies accountable to those who are affected
199. Id. art. 7.
200. Id.
201. Development is also an objective of other trade agreements, but largely as an ex-
pected and intended outcome of reductions in trade barriers. See, e.g., GATT pmbl. (stating
that members "[recognize] that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living [and] ensuring full employ-
ment," among other things, and expressing members' desire to contribute to these objectives
"by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the sub-
stantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade"). Under TRIPS, development is not
merely the intended outcome of minimum standards but one of the acknowledged objectives
of intellectual property regulation itself.
202. Frankel, supra note 125, at 6; see also id. at 5 ("While the GATT and GATS
agreements have as their overall goal the liberalisation of trade, the protection of intellectual
property is a different goal that sometimes works as a trade barrier, rather than a liberalising
tool.").
203. TRIPS Agreement pmbl.
204. For a discussion of the risks of protectionism, see generally Croley & Jackson,
supra note 167, at 206; Guzman, supra note 174, at 69.
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by their decisions. 205 Although the WTO adjudicatory bodies are accounta-
ble to the states that are members of the organization,0 6 they are not
accountable to the third parties whose interests are likely to be affected by
decisions that attempt to balance intellectual property with other national
priorities. Especially when the treaty itself requires consideration of the in-
terests of third parties affected by intellectual property regulation, greater
deference to national decision makers, who are more likely accountable to
such third parties, is warranted.
Developing a standard of review more suited to intellectual property
disputes will not eliminate all of the pressure associated with the risk of liti-
gation in the WTO system, nor should it. Rather, such a standard of review
would simply moderate the effect that the culture of overcompliance and
overly restrictive interpretations of the treaty have had on state willingness
to take advantage of TRIPS flexibilities. Requiring additional deference to
domestic policies would help restore the balance between public and private
interests that was struck in the TRIPS Agreement.2 °7
C. Application to IP Cases
Although the adoption of a standard of review tailored to intellectual
property disputes could increase state uncertainty about the outcomes of
panel adjudications, the overall result is likely to encourage more experi-
mentation with flexibilities protected under the treaty, thus better
approximating the bargain struck between developing and developed na-
tions in the terms of the treaty. A more deferential standard represents a shift
in interpretive power to states. By increasing states' interpretive authority,
deference would serve as a safe harbor, assuring states that if they actively
engage in the process of tailoring their intellectual property policies to local
needs, their efforts will be entitled to greater legitimacy. Such an approach
would "provid[e] developing country Members that intend to take measures
to safeguard access to medicine with ... security that they will not be
dragged into WTO dispute settlement or exposed to pressure by developed
205. Molly Beutz, Functional Democracy, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 387, 401-02 (2003)
(arguing that accountability systems should place decision making in the hands of those af-
fected by the decisions).
206. Croley and Jackson argue against the use of Chevron-style deference in the WTO
on the ground that the WTO is more accountable than member states. Croley & Jackson, su-
pra note 167, at 205. But see Dinwoodie, supra note 20, at 505 ("[T]he representational
legitimacy of the WTO panels is less than ideal"). Balancing, however, primarily affects third
parties to whom states, not the WTO, are more likely accountable.
207. Although beyond the scope of this Article, the most likely avenues for implement-
ing a new standard of review may be informal. Between the infrequency of panel decisions
on intellectual property issues and "the difficulty of amending or interpreting WTO law
through the WTO political process," Shaffer, supra note 96, at 470, neither litigation nor
amendment are likely to be successful. Informal means might include soft law instruments,
expert reports, negotiation, unilateral assertions of policy, and diplomatic exchanges, all of
which can foster changes in state practice and help build coalitions around new interpreta-
tions.
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country Members to adopt more stringent standards required under a differ-
ent interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement."
20 8
Although greater deference by panels with respect to state actions that
vindicate local public policies is warranted, this deference cannot be unfet-
tered. Both GATT and TRIPS limit the kinds of things states can do in
deviating from their principal obligations to protect the public interest. In
the GATT context, limits are imposed through the "chapeau" of Article XX,
which allows exceptions as long as they do not constitute "arbitrary or un-
justifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade."2 9 The TRIPS
Agreement imposes limits through the "consistency clause" of Article 8. Ar-
ticle 8(1), which provides that states may "adopt measures necessary to
protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest," lim-
its this authority to measures that are "consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement." ' Although there are a variety of different ways to interpret the
consistency clause, giving effect to its terms means at a minimum that
states' ability to use the flexibilities of the treaty cannot be greater than what
is permitted under the treaty.211 Although Susy Frankel has argued that ex-
ceptions and limitations should be interpreted more broadly than Article XX
of GATT because they do not contain the equivalent of the chapeau,21
2
Article 8(1) likely imposes an equivalent limitation by prohibiting actions
inconsistent with the treaty.
Although both treaties require panels to limit exceptions, they provide
very different guidance for doing so. The GATT chapeau evidences a prima-
ry concern with protectionism. States are entitled to take measures designed
to vindicate public policy goals as long as those measures are not applied in
a way that constitutes "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" or a "dis-
guised restriction on international trade. '213 Pursuant to Article 8(1) of the
TRIPS Agreement, states are allowed to take advantage of the flexibilities of
the treaty to protect the public interest as long as they do not exceed the au-
thority of the treaty.2 14 Although the TRIPS Agreement also incorporates the
208. HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 230 (2007). As Jerome Reichman argues, "[u]nless public offi-
cials in developing countries are willing to stand up for their rights under the TRIPS
Agreement and related conventions before the TRIPS Council and, where necessary, in WTO
dispute-resolution proceedings, they will not retain the full policy space in which to maneu-
ver that these conventions actually afford." Reichman, supra note 82, at 1177-78.
209. GATT art. XX.
210. TRIPS Agreement art. 8(1).
211. Grosse Ruse-Kahn, supra note 137, at 173-80 (summarizing the debate on the
"consistency clause" and arguing that it is best understood as limiting exceptions to those
enumerated in the treaty and providing an interpretive principle).
212. Frankel, supra note 157, at 427.
213. GATT art. XX.
214. TRIPS Agreement art. 8(l).
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principle of national treatment,215 the consistency clause of Article 8(1) re-
flects concerns not about protectionism but about scope. In applying the
consistency clause, WTO bodies should be concerned not with disguised
protectionism but with exceptions to intellectual property that are so broad
that they would "swallow the rule" and eviscerate the obligations of the
agreement.
Given the need for deference and the importance of ensuring this defer-
ence does not eviscerate the obligations of the treaty, how should panels
review state actions in the context of the TRIPS Agreement? At least with
respect to exceptions and limitations, panels could incorporate limited def-
erence into their decision making by adopting a principle of proportionality.
Two years after the formation of the WTO, Larry Helfer argued that panels
should draw on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
in determining the appropriate level of deference to national decision mak-
ing. Helfer argued that the court provided an appropriate model because of
its lengthy experience in grappling with the question of how to exercise in-
ternational supervision over a treaty that provides states with flexibility in
meeting their obligations.216 In light of the need for greater balancing in
the jurisprudence of the dispute settlement panels, it is a particularly ap-
propriate time to revisit Professor Helfer's proposal. Drawing on the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, a panel might con-
sider whether the harm caused by the exception was proportional to the
public policy goal to be achieved and whether the means sought were nar-
rowly tailored to achieving that goal. 217 Exceptions that do not meet these
criteria-those that are not proportional or narrowly tailored-would be
considered to impose "unreasonable" prejudice.1 8
Panels might also limit the deference afforded state determinations re-
garding what cases are "special" or what prejudice is "unreasonable" by
evaluating these claims against international human rights law and giving
greater weight to state actions designed to achieve human rights objectives.
For example, a panel might use international human rights law to evaluate a
state's claim that a particular copyright exception was a "special case" that
did not impose "unreasonable" prejudice on the copyright owner under
215. See, e.g., id. art. 9(1) (incorporating, inter alia, Article 5(1) of the Berne Agree-
ment, which establishes a principle of national treatment).
216. Helfer, supra note 184, at 363-64.
217. See, e.g., Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, App. No. 33290/96, 31 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 1055, 36 (1999) (finding no "reasonable relationship of proportionality" between dis-
tinction based on sexual orientation and aim pursued by the state).
218. Requiring measures to be proportional and narrowly tailored would be similar to
the "necessity" test used by WTO panels evaluating exceptions in the GATT/GATS context.
An exception is "necessary" under Article XX of GATT and Article XIV of GATS if it is de-
signed to achieve a permitted exception and is "the least trade restrictive measure which is
reasonably available to the Member State and is equally effective in achieving the desired
policy objective." Grosse Ruse-Kahn, supra note 137, at 189-90 (emphasis omitted); see al-
so Kur, supra note 121, at 247 (advocating adoption of the Article XX balancing test).
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Article 13. An exception or limitation might present a "special" or distinct
case if it were created in order to comply with international human rights
obligations, and any prejudice imposed in that effort would be less likely
"unreasonable." Such a "human rights presumption" would both control for
possible abuses of the deference afforded to state decision making and in-
crease the policy space available to states to tailor intellectual property
policies to achieve human rights objectives. In adopting this approach, WTO
adjudicatory bodies could look to the decision in Canada-Pharmaceutical
Patents, in which a panel similarly considered external sources for evidence
of legitimacy." 9 In that case, the panel evaluated the legitimacy of the inter-
est of a patent owner in being compensated for limits on the effective term
of a patent due to the need to obtain regulatory approval based on whether
this interest was widely recognized in the laws of WTO member states.20
In adopting a human rights presumption, it is important to note that
panels would not be applying human rights law. Although nothing explicitly
prohibits the WTO from applying non-WTO law in certain situations,221
panels have strictly limited the conditions under which they can consider
non-WTO law.222 Rather, in adopting this presumption, panels would be look-
ing to international human rights law to give content to ambiguous provisions
that require consideration of context. Doing so would simply constitute a
recognition that the relevant context includes a state's international obligations
to protect human fights. The use of a human rights presumption would pre-
serve the authority of the panel to review state actions but would also guard
against arbitrary or overly restrictive review by grounding panel review of
state policies in international human rights law.
Article 8 provides additional support for a human rights presumption.
Under Article 8, states may adopt measures that are "necessary to protect pub-
lic health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital
importance to their socio-economic and technological development" or "to
prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort
to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the inter-
national transfer of technology. '23 In explicitly mentioning state actions
designed to protect public health, nutrition, and the overall public interest,
219. Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, supra note 180, 7.82.
220. Id.
221. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far
Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535, 560 (2001) ("[T]he fact that the substantive jurisdiction
of WTO panels is limited to claims under WTO covered agreements does not mean that the
applicable law available to a WTO panel is necessarily limited to WTO covered agree-
ments.").
222. See, e.g., Robert L. Howse & Henri Horn, European Communities-Measures Af-
fecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 8 WORLD TRADE REv. 49, 55 (2009)
(discussing the panel's decision in EC Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, supra
note 182, requiring that "a rule of international law be binding between all the parties of the
treaty being interpreted in order to be taken into account in the interpretation of that treaty").
223. TRIPS Agreement art. 8(1)-(2).
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Article 8 not only acknowledges the importance of state intentions in inter-
preting exceptions and limitations but also presumptively privileges those
actions that are designed to further public interest goals. Panels and the Ap-
pellate Body can realize the intent of this provision by considering the
purposes the exception or limitation is designed to serve and privileging
those activities done to further human rights.
Moreover, panels can privilege actions undertaken to achieve human
rights goals entirely within the plain meaning of the terms of the treaty. The
TRIPS consistency clause in Article 8 limits exceptions and limitations to
those enumerated in the treaty by providing that states can take actions to
further the public interest, but only to the extent consistent with the treaty-
including with the treaty's existing flexibilities.2 24 Article 13 allows exceptions
constituting "special cases" that do not conflict with the "normal exploitation
of the work" and that do not "unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the right holder."225 An exception is more likely to meet the terms of the
three-step test if it is created to vindicate human rights: such an exception is
more likely to be a "special case," the "normal exploitation of the work" argu-
ably excludes uses that violate human rights, any prejudice associated with the
exception is less likely to be "unreasonable," and rights holders do not likely
have "legitimate" interests in causing human rights violations. Thus, panels
can protect the public policy goals articulated in Article 8 by considering in-
ternational human rights law in giving content to ambiguous terms in the
treaty.
To better understand the application of a principle of proportionality
and human rights presumption, imagine that a state exempts from copyright
materials used in primary and secondary school classrooms. It does so in
order to address a severe shortage of educational materials in the country.
Under this exception, teachers would be allowed to freely supplement the
students' textbooks (which may be incomplete or out of date) with
handouts or overhead slides in class. The exception was enacted to pro-
mote access to educational materials in furtherance of the state's
obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, which protects the right to education.2 26 As interpreted by
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the right to edu-
cation requires states to "fulfil (provide) the availability of education by
actively developing a system of schools, including ... providing teaching
materials.2 2 7 A panel considering this kind of an exception for classroom
224. Grosse Ruse-Kahn, supra note 137, at 174, 194-95. See also infra note 229 and
accompanying text.
225. TRIPS Agreement art. 13.
226. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 13, opened
for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
227. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13, The
Right to Education, 50, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/1999/10 (1999); see also id. 6(a) (noting that
"functioning educational institutions and programmes have to be available in sufficient quan-
tity" and observing that although what these institutions require to function may differ
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teaching materials under Article 13228 might conclude that it presents a
"special" case because the exception is designed to achieve human rights
objectives. The panel might determine that the exception would result in
economic prejudice to rights holders, but that such prejudice is not unrea-
sonable given the severe shortage of educational materials and the
importance of meeting the state's human rights obligations. A panel might
also find that the state's chosen measure is proportional to the alleged harm
and narrowly tailored to achieve the state's goal of increasing access.
229
Several others have also proposed alternative interpretive approaches
that would create more policy space for states to use TRIPS flexibilities.
Henning Grosse Ruse-Kahn and Peter Yu, among others, have proposed in-
terpreting ambiguous treaty language more broadly in light of the object and
purpose of the treaty as articulated in Articles 7 and 8.230 A more deferential
standard of review would achieve many of the same goals as these proposals
and would function in similar ways, giving more policy space to states in
cases of ambiguous treaty provisions. Framing interpretive deference as a
standard of review, however, would make clear that a deferential approach is
not only one among many acceptable methods of interpretation, 3 ' but one
that is required by the terms of the treaty.
depending on context, "all institutions and programmes are likely to require.., teaching ma-
terials").
228. The state could also make a declaration under the Berne Appendix. The Appendix
to the Berne Convention, which was incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement, TRIPS Agree-
ment art. 9(1), allows developing countries to issue compulsory licenses on copyrighted
works under certain circumstances. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works app., Sept. 9, 1886, 102 Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30. The provisions of the
Berne Appendix, however, are "so complex and arcane that very few developing countries
have been able or willing to take advantage of them." Chon, supra note 9, at 829; see also
Daniel J. Gervais, The Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New Challenges from the
Very Old and the Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 929, 941 n.67
(2002) ("Complexity may explain why the [Berne Appendix] system has fallen into disuse.").
229. This approach would achieve a result similar to the "thumb on the scale" that
Margaret Chon articulates in her substantive equality principle, pursuant to which "a deci-
sion maker should explicitly consider and defer to a developing country's stated policy of
promoting education for development." Chon, supra note 9, at 844.
230. See, e.g., Grosse Ruse-Kahn, supra note 137, at 200-05; Yu, supra note 6, at
1022-23; see also Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The (Non) Use of Treaty Object and Purpose
in Intellectual Property Disputes in the WTO 33-34 (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual
Prop. & Competition Law, Research Paper No. 11-15, 2012), available at http://
papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1939859 (discussing the infrequent use of Ar-
ticles 7 and 8 in WTO adjudication interpreting TRIPS).
231. See VCLT, supra note 128, art. 31 ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in light of its object and purpose.").
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IV. DEFERENCE TO LEAST DEVELOPED NATIONS
As the TRIPS transitional periods for least developed nations come to
an end, 232 it is an appropriate time to consider the deference afforded to least
developed countries in implementing the agreement, particularly in the
context of adjudication. The TRIPS Agreement and the DSU, as well as
concurrent interpretive statements, indicate the need for these countries to
have maximum flexibility in implementing their obligations under the
treaty. Panels can provide this flexibility by considering the extent to
which intellectual property policies foster development when they inter-
pret standard-type norms in the TRIPS Agreement.
The TRIPS Agreement and concurrent interpretive statements indicate
that least developed countries should enjoy maximum flexibility in imple-
menting their obligations under the treaty. The preamble of the TRIPS
Agreement specifically recognizes "the special needs of the least-developed
country Members in respect of the maximum flexibility in the domestic im-
plementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to create a
sound and viable technological base. '233 The Decision on Measures in Fa-
vour of Least-Developed Countries, a ministerial decision adopted in
conjunction with the agreement establishing the WTO and the covered
agreements, provides additional support for policies oriented to the needs
of least developed nations. The Decision states that least developed coun-
tries "will only be required to undertake commitments and concessions to
the extent consistent with their individual development, financial and trade
needs, or their administrative and institutional capabilities. '234 The Decision
further notes that "[tlhe rules set out in the various agreements and instru-
ments and the transitional provisions in the Uruguay Round should be
applied in a flexible and supportive manner for the least-developed coun-
tries. 235
This is not to say that least developed countries should be entitled to
separate substantive standards. The patent term required by the TRIPS
Agreement, for example, is twenty years, and this same term applies to
developed, developing, and least developed countries."' Nor does TRIPS
include the kinds of substantive "special and differential" treatment present
in other covered agreements. 37 At the same time, the final text of the treaty
232. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
233. TRIPS Agreement pmbl.
234. WTO, Ministerial Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries
of April 15, 1994, T 1, LT/UR/D-1/3 (1994).
235. Id. I 2(iii).
236. TRIPS Agreement art. 33.
237. CONSTANTINE MICHALOPOULOS, SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES IN TRIPS 2 (TRIPS Issues Papers No. 2, 2003) (noting the "lack of
substantial [special and differential treatment]" in the TRIPS Agreement and the problems
this poses for developing countries); see Bello, supra note 167, at 364 (describing the intent
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did retain significant flexibility for country-specific implementation.238 All
of the TRIPS flexibilities described in Part IA of this Article, combined with
Article l(1)'s requirement that states retain discretion in implementation,
provide a basis that is more than sufficient for interpreting these common
standards in context-specific ways.
In addition, developing countries were able to negotiate explicit
consideration of development goals.2 39 Among other things, Article 7
requires consideration of the extent to which intellectual property furthers
development.240 This does not mean that a country is exempt from TRIPS
obligations where these benefits are not being realized. It does suggest,
however, that greater deference might be accorded to state policies that limit
intellectual property rights in order to achieve the objectives of Article 7.
Thus, while the treaty does impose common substantive standards, it also
requires that these standards be implemented in ways that foster
development objectives.
The DSU also requires particular attention to the needs of least developed
countries in adjudication. As I have argued elsewhere,2 41 one of the most
important and least well-known provisions of the DSU offering flexibility to
least developed countries is Article 24(1). Article 24(1) of the DSU states: "At
all stages of the determination of the causes of a dispute and of dispute
settlement procedures involving a least-developed country Member, particular
consideration shall be given to the special situation of least-developed country
Members." 242 This "particular consideration" is mandatory, not discretionary,
of the United States in negotiating the TRIPS Agreement to limit "special and differential"
treatment in this treaty to transitional periods).
238. MUSUNGU & OH, supra note 30, at 4 (noting that developing nations were suc-
cessful in negotiating "a degree of policy autonomy for governments in relation to the
implementation of the Agreement's obligations").
239. The final text of the treaty largely reflects proposals submitted by developed na-
tions, although the language of Articles 7 and 8, which emphasize the development-related
purposes of the Agreement, was taken from a proposal by developing countries. Daniel Ger-
vais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: The State of Play, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
505, 508 (2005) ("The final agreement mirrored the 'A' text. As such, it essentially embodied
norms that had been accepted by industrialized countries. The concerns of developing coun-
tries were reflected in large part in two provisions-Articles 7 and 8."); see also TRIPS
RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 1, at 123-24; DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:
DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 17-19 (1998); Yu, supra note 6, at 990-91, 1004.
240. TRIPS Agreement art. 7.
241. See Molly Land, Adjudicating TRIPS for Development, in TRIPS AND DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES: NEW PERSPECTIVES (Gustavo Ghidini et al. eds., forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 10-12) (on file with author).
242. DSU art. 24(1). Although the specific examples provided by Article 24(1) relate to
affirmative actions that member states can themselves take with respect to other members,
there is no indication that these are exhaustive of the "particular consideration" due to least
developed country members. Other provisions of the DSU call for special and differential
treatment in consultation, implementation, and adjudication. See, e.g., id. art. 3(12) (alterna-
tive procedures for consultation), art. 21(2) (special attention in the context of
implementation), art. 8(10) (ability to request panelist from developing country).
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and explicitly embraces procedures governing the deliberative process. The
article requires particular consideration both "[a]t all stages of the
determination of the causes of a dispute" as well as "of dispute settlement
procedures." The determination of the causes of a dispute occurs during the
hearing itself, when the panel evaluates the reasons for the parties' dispute
and their respective fault. Thus, this phrase specifically contemplates
procedures that occur during the hearing itself, such as the use of a more
deferential standard of review. Interpreting ambiguous provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement to allow consideration of the development objectives of
exceptions and limitations and adopting a standard of review that provides
particular deference to the decisions of least developed countries in this regard
are important ways in which panels could provide "particular consideration"
to the needs of least developed countries in dispute settlement.
It is particularly important to consider the extent to which intellectual
property policies foster development because such policies may impose
more costs than benefits for least developed countries. Although countries in
transition, such as Brazil and India, may see gains from strong rights in
some instances,243 recent empirical research indicates that developing coun-
tries as a whole may not realize much economic growth through the
adoption of strong intellectual property rights.2" Implementation is also
more expensive in relative terms for countries with poor legal infrastruc-
ture.2 45 Further, the costs of implementation have largely not been offset by
the economic growth, increased foreign direct investment, and technology
transfer that proponents of the TRIPS Agreement anticipated. 246 Premature
adoption of TRIPS Agreement standards, before a country has had the
chance to establish a technological infrastructure and creative communities
that can take advantage of these standards, may well "put the cost of becom-
ing innovative out of reach. 2 47 As Carolyn Deere has noted, "For the
poorest developing countries ... there are questions regarding the degree to
which IP laws are relevant at all.
248
Because least developed countries benefit so little from the type of
intellectual property policies championed by developed countries, different
243. See Dreyfuss, supra note 102, at 2-3.
244. Robert L. Ostergard, Jr., Economic Growth and Intellectual Property Rights Pro-
tection: A Reassessment of the Conventional Wisdom, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 115, 140.
245. See, e.g., Jean R. Homere, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: A View
from the United States, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note
3, at 333, 344; Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 184, at 302-03 (discussing costs of setting
up systems to grant, monitor, and enforce intellectual property rights as well as costs associ-
ated with loss of comparative advantage).
246. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 102, at 4; Peter K. Yu, Are Developing Countries
Playing a Better TRIPS Game?, 16 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. (forthcoming 2011)
(manuscript at 5) (on file with author).
247. See, e.g., Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 184, at 303.
248. DEERE, supra note 44, at 103.
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and greater exceptions and limitations may be required in these countries to
create appropriate innovation policies. The extent to which a particular
policy supports or hinders development might be considered, for example,
in evaluating whether a case is "special" or prejudice is "unreasonable"
under the terms of the treaty. A broad fair use doctrine that significantly
limits copyright rights with respect to educational materials might not
impose an "unreasonable" prejudice on rights holders when the exception is
needed to foster development and where there may be little realistic
expectation that the educational materials in question would otherwise be
purchased by consumers in that market. The approach of the TRIPS
Agreement, which integrates deference into the terms of the treaty itself,
provides an additional advantage of flexibility. Instead of enabling
exceptions based on a country's classification as "developing" or "least
developed," TRIPS allows panels to consider development objectives based
on real economic circumstances. Development needs change, and with time,
the conditions that initially necessitated the exception may evolve or even
cease to exist.
CONCLUSION
The need for flexibility in implementing the terms of the TRIPS
Agreement is clear. Indeed, Peter Yu has argued that the system's very
"legitimacy has been called into question by the high standards of protec-
tion and enforcement that ignore the needs, interests, and goals of the
less-developed member states." '249 The TRIPS Agreement-by its own
terms-does provide states with considerable flexibility in implementa-
tion. Yet the decision to link intellectual property standards to mandatory
trade dispute resolution has played an important role in constraining poli-
cy space for states looking to tailor national intellectual property policies
to local needs and conditions. The risk of litigation and overly restrictive
interpretations of exceptions and limitations have created a culture of
overcompliance that discourages states from testing the flexibilities pro-
tected under TRIPS.
The articulation of a more deferential standard of review designed spe-
cifically for the TRIPS Agreement, with an emphasis on proportionality and
human rights, could help protect the flexibilities that the treaty was designed
to provide. Deference is not only consistent with the terms of the treaty but
is also necessary to effectuate the intent of the drafters, particularly with re-
spect to least developed countries. In the context of the WTO, such a
standard would provide states with the space they need to develop intellec-
tual property regulations tailored to local needs. The very existence of such
a safe harbor can encourage states to engage in the kind of experimentation
that is necessary for the development of both domestic and international in-
novation policy.
249. Yu, supra note 6, at 1024.
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Of course, providing states with additional policy space does not neces-
sarily mean that they will make use of this space to create better policies. As
Deere notes, even in countries where debate about intellectual property pol-
icy has taken place, "well-organized, pro-IP industry lobbies dominated
decision-making processes while consumer groups generally had a 'weak,
diffused, virtually voiceless interest.' 250 Few countries have actually en-
gaged in a deliberative process that has allowed them to weigh the pros and
cons of different approaches to intellectual property regulation and their ef-
fect on development.2 11 Yet deferring to national decisions with respect to
intellectual property policy, even if such decisions are potentially subject to
capture, offers at least the possibility of innovation and better approximates
the deal struck by member states in the TRIPS Agreement. In addition,
providing incentives for states to attempt to balance international obligations
with local needs may foster more deliberative national decision making. If
panels were to consider the reasons provided by the state for enacting an
exception to intellectual property rights, the state has an incentive to engage
in reasoned decision making. Evaluating whether the exception is propor-
tional and narrowly tailored to achieving its public policy goal may
encourage states to create records that demonstrate consideration of several
objectives or reflect negotiations over the scope of the exception. A princi-
ple of deference may in this way "push not only for particular substantive
outcomes, but also for legitimate domestic processes to achieve those
goals. 25 2
Finally, the range of arguments presented at the national level would al-
so contribute to the development of international intellectual property
norms. With so few intellectual property cases being decided by WTO adju-
dicatory bodies, increased engagement with and reasoned decision making
about these issues on the domestic level would provide an important source
of normative content about ways in which states can balance intellectual
property rights with other objectives, such as human rights. So conceived,
deference might encourage what Dreyfuss and Dinwoodie have called "bot-
tom up" approaches to international intellectual property lawmaking,2 53 with
250. DEERE, supra note 44, at 206 (citations omitted); see also Shaffer & Trachtman,
supra note 140, at 149 ("[N]ational and sub-national political decision-making processes can
be highly problematic from the perspectives of participation, accountability, and global so-
cial and political welfare.").
251. DEERE, supra note 44, at 209.
252. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law
Is Domestic (or, the European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 327, 348 (2006). In this
way, deference may have effects similar to those of the principle of "embeddedness" in the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Heifer has explained "embeddedness" as a
willingness to reach deeply into areas normally reserved to the state in a way that strengthens
domestic institutions. See Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human
Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Re-
gime, 19 EuR. J. INT'L L. 125, 131-33 (2008).
253. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 1190.
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states (again) playing a primary role in generating norms at the intersection
of intellectual property and public policy.
